THE EVIDENT APPROACH OF A WAR; And Something of The NECESSITY of It, In Order to Establish PEACE, and Preserve TRADE.
Pax Quaeritur Bello.
To which is Added, An Exact PLAN and DESCRIPTION of the BAY and CITY of GIBRALTAR.
LONDON:
Printed; And Sold by J. ROBERTS in
Warwick-Lane
; and A. DODD in the
Strand.
1727. [Price 1
s.
6
d.
]
THE PREFACE.
THREE Things in this Work seem to call for a Word or two of Preface; but I shall be very Brief.
1. The Unreasonableness of our Impatience to know the Certainty of things before our Governors thought fit to explain them, call'd aloud for some Reproof.
2. The Apprehensions some People were under, or pretended to be under, for our Publick Credit, and for our Commerce in case of a War, Neither of which seem to be in the least Danger, call'd (as loud) for
ditto.
3. The Officious Entring upon this Subject, tho' ever so well intended, seems to call for some Apology.
The Author thinks the two first are sufficiently defended in the Manner of reproving them, and adds nothing to it for that Reason; and for the Last, as he has taken all possible Care to give no Offence, and that the whole Tenour of the Work is evidently calculated for the Honour, Interest, and Service of His Majesty, and the whole
British
Nation, and perfectly abstracted from all private Views or Desires, He humbly hopes, no Slip of the Pen, if such should be, tho' he has with the utmost Care guarded against that also, shall be misconstrued to his Prejudice.
THE Evident
Approach
of a WAR, &c.
CHAP. I.
A short Introduction; with a Remark upon the Impatience of some People to know before-hand whether we shall have
Peace
or
War.
The Reason of their uneasy Haste; and something of Who the People are. Also an Enquiry whether our Stocks and Publick Credit should not Rise, rather than Fall, upon the Prospect of a War.
WHEN all the Politicians of the Town are consulting their Oracles upon this Important Subject, and that the first Question in all Conversation is,
Peace
or
War?
I hope if I may not give my own Opinion, I may be a little merry with those that do.
Indeed, if we go to the Merit of the Case, I cannot see why every
British
Freeholder may not claim a Right to talk of it, and enquire a little into it, modestly, and as becomes them; since in most Cases that I meet with, if any Body has a Right to enquire into the Rate of a Thing, 'tis those who pay for it.
War and Peace in
Great Britain,
are, notwithstanding all our Privileges, in the Breast of the King; 'tis a Branch of the Prerogative; no Body disputes it; and I suppose 'tis the Prerogative of most of the Kings of
Europe
also, and so 'tis meet it should be.
Let the Kings (Name a' God) make a War or a Peace,
Let 'em Fight, or give o'er, as their Majesties please.
Let's be anxious no more, whatever's our Doom;
Tho' we Fight all the World, let's be Easy at Home.
Leaving then the Superficials for the Superficial to refine upon, let us see what it is the Town is so restless about. For my Part, I don't see the People I speak of, half so much concern'd about the Thing it self, as about their not knowing it
before-hand;
a certain Hint of their Meaning; which is, in a Word, that they want to make a Bubble of it, and that before it begins too. Who may be bubbled by it when it comes, is a Question by it self.
And how unaccountable is this Imparience among us? Why cannot the Town be easy, and let things go on in the ordinary Course? If a War is for our Advantage, 'twill be good News when it comes; if not, bad News comes fast enough. Let us have Patience; we most hear of it in the End, or Taxes must be lighter than usual in like Cases.
But there is a Figure in all this Speech; More intended than is express'd: How happens it else that those People are most concerned to be at a Certainty about a War, who are like to have the least Hand in it when it comes?
Latet anguis in berba.
If a War was just now Declared, the People who are thus eager with their Enquiries, may appear to have no manner of Concern in it, one way or other.
They are always most busy who have least to do.
In a Word, the present Haste we are in to know what shall be, is not a meer Curiosity and Impatience, but 'tis a Bite; they want to be the first in the Secret, and to know it before their Neighbours, for Uses and Purposes; and these Uses and Purposes are worth our Inquiry after.
Some are of Opinion, and I among the rest, that the Curiosity of the Times should not be satisfy'd; and that much is to be learnt, tho' perhaps not so much to be got, by the State of Uncertainty Men are in at this Time: At least this is to be learnt, that People
within Doors
see what Fools we are
without Doors,
to think we understand them.
Statesmen always gain by being secret: If they have nothing at all upon the Anvil, say nothing, or mean nothing when they speak, they always pass for Politicians when they are Private; and we will have it that they are wise Men when they are doing nothing, tho' it be only because they have nothing to do.
But why are we
without Doors
so impatient to know what perhaps no Body here can tell us? and why do we not enquire where it is to be known? Is this the Place for the Question to be started in? Or is
Madrid
and
Vienna
the proper Center of the Intelligence?
Who do we ask? And why do we talk of it here? 'Tis plain his Majesty has resolved, if possible, to preserve the Peace. If 'tis to be a War, I think you should ask the King of
Spain,
the Emperor, the
Czarina,
and those Heroes of War the
Poles,
who talk of Fighting as if the World durst not look them in the Face. Happy!
Strangely Happy!
is this Age, that the only Nations that seem eager for a War, are those that are least able to carry it on; and those that seem forwardest for Fighting, are those that when they come to it, have been always forwardest to run away.
To hear the
Spaniards
talk of fitting out Ships of War, and the
Poles
of raising Armies! I must confess, if I were to speak freely upon the Subject, and any Man who I thought worth an Answer should ask me Whether we should have a War with these
Spaniards
and
Muscovites?
I should answer,
some little Articles excepted,
I am afraid not.
To hear the
Poles
threaten the King of
Prussia;
talk of his doing Homage to them for Part of his Country; reject the Memorials of the Protestants, and order their Troops (their Invincible Poltroons) to march to the Frontiers; methinks 'tis of a Piece with the Orders of their late Dyet, to dispose of two Millions of
Polish
Florins, when 'tis said they have but 40000 in their Exchequer.
Then, as I said, to hear the
Spaniard
talk of fitting out 50 Ships of War, when all
Spain
is not able to furnish 3000 Seamen; to hear of their furnishing the Emperor with three Millions
per Ann.
by way of Subsidy, when they can't bring home their Plate Fleet from Abroad, for fear of eight Men of War, and can hardly borrow 200000 Crowns in all their Seven Kingdoms at Home; These are merry Things it must be allow'd, and fit for little else, in my Opinion, but to be laugh'd at.
To hear from the
Baltick,
that the
Czarina
has order'd her Fleet to be fitted out Early in the Spring, when she has lately let us see, that if 20
English
Men of War appear, they dare not look abroad: And then, for fitting them out EARLY, that's another Jest too, as if they could get out before we could get in; or that they could Sail over the Ice, and put to Sea when their Ports are frozen up. For my Part, I can hardly believe they talk so at
Petersburgh;
I think they can never be so silly. I am rather of Opinion our News-mongers make it for them; just as they did the other Day the
French
laying up great Magazines at
Luxemburgh,
which is a City in the Hands of the Emperor, one of the Barrier Towns. The
Muscovites
can no more come out into the Ocean without our Leave, or without fighting our Fleet, and beating it too, than their Ships can fly over the Mountains. If they design such things as are talk'd of, and to come into the Ocean with a Fleet, they must change the Scene of their Marine Affairs, and go and build Men of War at
Arch-Angel
or in
Nova Zembla,
and then they may indeed go to Sea without Interruption; but 'till they do that, they may cease concerning themselves in the Naval Affairs of
Europe;
and if they do it, they will be little more than laugh'd at.
These are the terrible People to whom we should go with our Important Question, and of whom we should so submissively ask whether they please to give
Peace
or
War
to the so much weaker Kings of
France
and
Great Britain. Why should we not ask of them that know?
It is true, they are scarce worth our Notice in the Case before us; and that, in my Opinion, makes the Question about
Peace
and
War
the less Important; and our Impatience about it seems the more Enigmatick. What mighty Haste are we in? and what great Stress do we lay upon a War with such People, as (Heaven knows) are hardly worth the Question; and who, as the
Turks
said once to the
Muscovites, hardly knew how to make War, and were not worth making Peace with.
But to bring all this home to our Selves, and look into the Inside of Things with our Eyes open, and the Mists of Art cleared a little up; and so talk something gravely to it: If the Enemies which we are like to have upon our Hands,
supposing a War,
are such as I have hinted at, Why all this Concern about
Peace
or
War
with them? Why so anxious to know things before-hand? Why so much Noise about nothing! There must be more in it of one Kind, if there is not of another; it cannot be all meer Curiosity, meer
Athenianism;
an Enquiry for meer Tittle Tattle, and for the Pleasure of a Tale.
The Case is plain, all this Part is of a mean and scandalous Original, hardly worth naming; 'tis the ALLY, and the JOBBERS, that make the greatest Part of the Noise; and they want to be answered, only that they may know how to
Put
and
Refuse,
how to
Sell out
or
Buy in,
and to make a Bubble of the War before it begins.
Now as this is in it self a Trifle not worth spending two Words about, much less to ground such a Clamour upon; a thing below Reproof, too mean for Satyr, has neither Jest or Earnest in it, and circulates between the F—s and the K—s only; beginning and ending within and among themselves; so I had not dirty'd my Fingers with it here, only to introduce a Superior Enquiry with it, and which may be of some Use to us to speak of upon this Occasion, and some others also that may follow.
This more significant Enquiry is as follows:
"Why should the Certainty of a War or of a Peace influence the Price of our Stocks, that is to say, the Publick Credit, one way or other?
'Tis indeed for the sake of this Question that I mention these People, and begin my Discourse with what would otherwise look so trifling. I must confess, if the Question was put another way, I could give a more direct Answer to it, and support that Answer with better Reasons:
I mean thus;
If the Question was, Whether the Certainty of a Peace or War ought to influence the Publick Credit, and the Price of Stocks, one way or other: I say, if this was the Question, I should, without the least Hesitation, answer in the
Negative;
it ought not any way to affect the Credit or the Funds, no, not in the least; and 'tis unaccountably foolish that it should be otherwise.
If I should incline to give it one way or other, and say which way should the Publick Credit be most affected, I should answer, That a War should make Stocks rise, not sink them; and I should value my self much more upon my little Interest among them, in Case of a War, than in View of a Peace; and I may come to give you my Reasons for this also, in their Place.
It is true, it pass'd for a Maxim of War in the Time of
Julius Caesar,
Never to despise an Enemy; but 'tis as good a Maxim, tho' not so Antient, Not to
Over-rate
an Enemy.
He that is afraid before he fights, will be sure to be beaten.
To run down our Estates, sink the Value of our Funds, Sell out in a Hurry, and abate the Publick Credit because of a War, and such a War as this too! What is it but Fear? nay, 'tis worse, 'tis a Fright; and without Despising our Enemy (that may be) 'tis Rating him much too high. As
Spain
is not so Inconsiderable as not to be worth our Preparations, so I am sure it is not so Considerable as to be worth our Apprehensions; their Power seems but to make the War half a Jest, and sure their Threatnings and Swagger ought to be far from turning it into Earnest.
I cannot but think there is some Similitude between the
Spaniards
talking of a War, and their late Prohibition of our Manufacturers; they prepare for War without Money, and they prohibit Trade without Clothes.
The King of
Spain,
they tell us, forbids his People to wear any of the Manufactures of Wool or Silk, made in other Countries; and yet 'tis plain they can make none of their own; so that 'tis a kind of a Proclamation for the People to go naked.
Let them take away the Manufactures of
England, France,
and the Seventeen Provinces, and tell us, if they can, what their People must wear? the poor
Spaniards
may indeed be careful, notwithstanding the Scripture Prohibition, about
wherewithal they shall be clothed.
Not the Priests have a Cassock, not the Nuns a Veil, not the Gentlemen a Cloak, or the Ladies a Robe, I might have said a Smock, but what are made of some foreign Manufacture. They have not one Manufacture or Material to make it of, in the whole Dominion, which we now call
Spain,
that can amount to the cloathing of the Inhabitants of one Province, nay hardly of one City.
They have Wool indeed, but by it self 'tis too soft, too fine, and too tender to work, nor will it make any Manufacture of Value, unless they could get Wool of a coarser kind to mix with it. They have a little Silk, but no Quantity. They have neither Hemp or Flax. In a Word, they prohibit the Commerce just as they seem to make War, to show their Teeth, or rather to show that they have no Teeth. As they have no Manufactures to substitute in the room of those they prohibit, so they have no Ships to defend the Trade they would exclude us from.
Never Nation went to War in the Circumstances which the
Spaniards
must now, if they do make a War of it; and that makes me think sometimes they are not in earnest, that it is all Grimace, and a kind of
Quixotisme;
For the
Spaniards,
take them abstracted from their particular Resentments, were always reckoned a wise considering Nation. They have made War in former Ages, and sometimes with Success; as under those truly Great Princes, the Emperor
Charles
V, and
Philip
II; and since that in Confederacy with some or other of the Powers of
Europe
that were in Condition to support them at Sea: and we may say there was some Sense in that Part; because their Weakness at Sea being supported, they in some measure could preserve their
American
Correspondence; receive Supplies of Treasure by their Plate Fleets, and could have the Support of Troops, if wanted, either by Land or by Sea; as was their Case in their late Wars against
France;
and afterwards against the present Emperor, when they were supported by
France.
In the First, the Confederates guarded their Flota's, and convoyed their Ships by Sea; in the Second, the
French
marched powerful Armies to their Assistance by Land; and yet in both those Wars,
Spain
suffered sometimes prodigious Losses; as in the First by the
French,
in
America,
when Monsieur
Pointy
took
Carthagena;
and in the Last, by the
English
at
Vigo,
and the like.
But now they have not an Allie that can help them by Land, or by Sea; no not one: and yet they want to make a War! 'Tis answered, the Emperor is their Allie, and his Armies are powerful, his Troops good, his Generals the best of the Age (that is to say, being interpreted,
some of the best
) and that he will support them with all his Forces.
As to the Imperial Support, we shall have room to speak of it when we come to see how well the Emperor will support himself and his own Country; but for the present, as it relates to
Spain,
I may take notice, that perhaps the Emperor might support, or at least assist the
Spaniards,
if he knew how to come at them; but which way will that be done? and upon what Foundation does the Emperor propose to do it, or the
Spaniards
to expect it.?
By Land it is impracticable, unless the Imperial Troops appointed for it could first fight their way from
Italy
or
Alsatia,
thro' the Heart of
France,
and so enter
Spain
by Land; for by Sea they cannot pretend to it; the
British
and
Dutch,
and perhaps
French
Squadrous lying directly in the Way to intercept them.
At present
Spain
is surrounded on every Side by Land, way-laid on every Side by Sea, they can neither be succoured by Troops from their Friends, or supplied with Money from their own Dominions; and yet these are the People of whom we must enquire whether we shall have War or Peace; and with whom if we have a War, our Bubblemakers pretend, the Stocks must fall, and the publick Funds sink in their Value! What Reasons they can give for it, I must confess I am at a Loss to find.
It is true there are Facts and Events which frequently offer to our View, of which we can only say
they are,
not why or for what Reason they exist; as some
Phoenomena
appear in the Heavens which are strange and unaccountable, and of which our best Astronomers can say
they are,
rather than give any Account from whence or by what Powers in Nature they exist; what their Motions and Revolutions are, or how performed; such as Comets, surprising Meteors, Balls of Fire, and other Appearances in the Air.
There must be some
Aenigma,
some
Arcana,
in the Councils of that part of the World, and they must have some Dependances which we can see no room for, and can make no probable Guesses at; or else the
Spaniards
seem to be the most void of Council, or their Council (such as they are) the most void of Sense, of any People now acting as a Nation, and in the Capacity of a Monarchy, in the World. I know nothing can be more wonderful in the Course of all the Politicks of
Europe
than their present Conduct; nor in my Opinion can a greater Prodigy happen in the World, unless it should be to see them come well off at last, which I would not Insure under 100
per
Cent.
These things, and the abundant Patience of His Majesty and the
British
Government, waiting the ntmost Length of Time, trying all pacifick Measures, and offering beyond what the
Spaniards
have the least Reason to expect, in order to prevail with them not to run into a War which they are in no Condition to carry on: I say, these are the only Reasons that would perswade me to think still that it would not be a War: my Meaning is, I cannot think the
Spaniards
are so entirely abandon'd, so given up to their Piques and personal Resentments, so blind against their own Interest and Safety, so infatuated and resolved for their own Ruin, as to run headlong into a War, which in all human Probability must issue in their Loss, if not in the utter Destruction of their Interest, and perhaps of their very Government: of which I shall say more in its order.
And is this the War that must sink our Stocks! Will any Man Sell out, as they call it, for the Apprehensions of such a War as this! Let the
Bear-skin Men
that build upon that Prospect, depend upon it, that whatever Use they make of the Word
War,
which I know is a formidable Word, and is of late made, as we call it, a Term of Art in their way, to run down the Price of things, and make their Game of among themselves; yet upon the whole, it will go but a little way, and they themselves will buy their own Stock up again in a very few Days, after they have Bubbled it out in a Fright without ground.
The many frequent Occasions in which those People have been thus taken in their own Snares, are not worth our Notice, tho' they are very well worth theirs, that they may learn to be wiser: The Stocks which fall by this Art will never lie there, but will ccertainly advance with the greater Reflux, as soon as the first Judgment of such a War is pass'd; and not to make the
Spaniards
seem meaner and more despicable than they are, the little Reason there can be to lay any Stress upon their Part of the War, or to raise any Pannicks among us from the Prospect of it, the more ashamed these People will be of having sunk the Rate of things upon that Occasion.
It seems, if this Matter was examined, that the Gentlemen who are now so impatient to have this secret Intelligence, put much more Weight upon themselves than the World may think fit to put upon them; believing that as they please to Rate their Stocks, so the rest of the World should Rate the War.
War is a terrible Word, and were it circumstanced in any manner but as this with
Spain
seems to be, there might be something of Foundation for it; But Reason dictates that we should distinguish according to the particular People we are to engage with. Now if any good Politician will tell us what Nation in the World it could be wish'd we should differ with rather than
Spain;
then I'll allow they might suggest a Fall of Stocks upon the Rupture.
But where is the Nation of the World that we can get more by, and are likely to lose less by, in case of a War? In how many Places in the World are they exposed even to our Adventurers and Letter-of-Mart Men, where they cannot defend themselves against five hundred Men, and yet have immense Riches to lose? How easie is it, not only to insult their
West-India
Colonies, but even to dispossess them; and to take from them the immense Riches of
Mexico
and
Peru?
This adds to our Wonder in behalf of the
Spaniards,
makes the Infatuation appear the more gross, and seems to be still a Reason why we should think there can be no War; that is to say, that I think the
Spaniards
can never carry on the Jest so far. People in their Senses never run great Hazards, where they have much to lose; and as we know His Majesty has taken all the wise Measures to preserve Peace, we cannot suppose the
Spaniards
can come into a War, unless they are fallen under some National Infatuation.
For a Nation to quarrel that are not able to fight, to make a War when they are sure to lose by it, and have so much to lose too, is a Token of insufferable Stupidity.
For this Reason I would close the Account thus,
viz. No War,
unless the
Spaniards
are mad; 'tis next to impossible. The
Spaniards
can never come into a War without a Blast upon their politick Sense and Understanding; and 'tis still more irrational to think, that a War with such a Nation can be any Foundation for the running down our Stocks and Funds,
&c.
As to the Advantages of a War with
Spain,
and the good Terms on which it might, and probably may, be carried on by
Great Britain,
I shall take that into Consideration by it self, when the Wisdom of the
Spaniards,
and of their present Conduct, may be farther illustrated as it deserves.
CHAP. II.
That Some may be allowed to enquire, and should, if possible, be informed of the Approach of a War before it is begun; and that it is just in a Government to give them as much Information as they conveniently can.
HAving thus touch'd gently the Grounds and Reasons of our present Impatience about Peace and War, and how far some People make a Bubble of the Enquiry, as they would do afterwards of the Discovery, and of the Thing itself; I must add, that after all, and abstracting the Thing from those jobbing Designs, which we must acknowledge are mean and low-priz'd enough, yet there are some People in the World who are justly concern'd to enquire, and anxious to know too, what will be the Issue of these things; and this upon a better Account, and who have very honest Reasons for their Enquiries; and it is on their Account that these Sheets are made publick.
1.
The Merchants abroad
are concerned to make a Judgment of things: Many of these being settled in the Ports and Dominions of such Princes and Powers as may be or are like to be Enemies in case of a Rupture, 'tis of Importance to them to have as early an Account of things as they can; that they may secure their Persons and Effects in time from the Violences frequently made use of on such Occasions; and this may be one Reason why our Letters from
Spain
and
Italy
and other Parts of the World are full of importuning Enquiries about it.
2.
The Insurers,
who are far from being an inconsiderable Body among the Merchants at home, have Reason to be concerned in the Enquiry; for that being to under-write Policies which are of very great Value, and insure upon Ships and Cargoes going long Voyages, 'tis of the last Importance to them to know what Risque they may run, in order to know what Premio's to take, saited to the Times that are to come.
As things may happen, many Ships may go out in Peace and come back in War; or they may go out in Peace, and a War break out before they arrive at the Port they are insured to; so that the Insurer knows not what Hazard he runs, or how to suit his Demand; nor does the Insured know what Premio to give, any more than the other knows what to ask.
Trade should not be embarrassed with Uncertainties, or with unforeseen Hazards. The Merchant has in all Ages been much the Care of wise and just Governors; they are a useful and valuable Part of the Common-wealth, and their Interest should be regarded on all Occasions: The Welfare of the Community very much depends upon the Safety of the Merchants and of their Effects: By them the People are employed, the Navigation encouraged, Numbers of Sailors maintained and bred up, the Revenue encreased, and the great Article of Commerce carried on and continued in this Kingdom.
They that venture their Estates and Persons abroad, that establish Factories, settle Houses, and give Commissions for buying and selling in foreign Parts, should not be kept in Ignorance and in the Dark, 'till the very last Moment of a Rupture. The Government will not leave them to the Mercy of the Enemies, betray them into the hands of Violence; or give them up at least without a due Concern for them, and without giving them time to shift for themselves, to secure their Effects, and to avoid the impending Storm.
3. In like case the
Merchants at home
shipping off daily large Quantities of Goods for foreign Parts, it would look particularly unkind to expose them to ingulph themselves and their Fortunes in the publick Resentment, if it may be avoided; leaving them to push on their Trade in Security, under the Protection of Peace, while a War is in the very Embrio, and as it were just breaking out; in which case they would often find themselves on the sudden surprized, their Estates confiscated and seized upon, and their Factors abroad ruined and undone.
It has been usual for Governments to give their Merchants private Hints in such Cases, not only not to run farther Hazards, not to launch out by continuing to ship off farther and greater Stocks of Goods, but to take care in time of the Effects they have already abroad; to dispose and secure them, that they may not be exposed to the Enemies; and when a Government does not do so, 'tis reasonable to conclude there is really no Danger.
4.
Masters and Owners of Ships
are concerned and may justly be anxious to know whether Peace or War is in the View of the State they live under, that they may man and arm their Ships in proportion to the Circumstances of things; otherwise if they go out weak, and a War breaks out, they are made a Prey to Rovers and Privateers; if they go out strong, and the Peace continues, they are at a needless Expence in hiring more Men than they want, and laying in greater Stores than they have Occasion for; all which eats into, or rather eats out, the Profits of the Voyage.
5. The
very Seamen themselves
are justly concern'd in the Enquiry; for as, in all such Cases, the Rate of Seamens Wages bears a Proportion to the Risques they run, and to the Dangers they may fall into; so 'tis a Wrong to the poor Men to ship themselves at the ordinary Wages, if a War is at hand; and 'tis a Wrong to Trade to be obliged to pay advanced Wages, and consequently Advance of Freight for Goods, in view of a War, if no War is intended.
6.
Tradesmen at home
are concern'd to know, whether there is likely to be Peace or War, that they may know what and when to buy or sell, when to lay in Stocks and Stores of Goods, and when not: If a War be in View, 'tis the Tradesman's Business to store himself with such Goods as are Imported from Abroad before the Price advances, before the Hazards of War make them uncertain in their Arriving, and as well in Time as in Quantity. The
Vintner
lays in a Stock of Wines, and buys freely, that he may not be forc'd to buy in a Scarcity; the
Dyer
lays in a Stock of Cocheneal and Indigo, Gauls and Gums, that he may work as cheap as before, if possible, and his Merchants not go from him to another; the Country
Clothier,
if he hears of a War, lays in a Stock of Oil for his Carders and Combers, and of
Spanish
Wool for his fine Clothes; that if a War happens, he may not be out of Goods for the carrying on his Business, and be forc'd to buy Dearer than his Neighbours.
Again; if these Tradesmen buy, if they lay in a Stock of Goods with a prospect of War, and no War happens; if the Seller uses Art to deceive them, and perswade them that there will be a War,
(as is often done)
and no War follows: I say, these Tradesmen are hurt extremely, they are clog'd with Goods, run out Stocks, got deep into Debt, and the Rate of their own Goods not at all raised; so that they are irreparably weaken'd by the Disappointment, and sometimes ruin'd.
These things, with many of the like, justify the Enquiries of the Men of Business (especially) into the Posture of publick Affairs, and whether they are likely to issue in Peace or War; and it is in Consideration of these that I enter thus into the Enquiry. As for our Friends of the
Jobbing
Business, they are a Nation by themselves, and we have nothing to do with them in the Case; nor are they otherwise worth taking notice of, except as before.
Since then there are some People to whom it is reasonable we should give as much Light into things as we can, Consistent with the Publick Interest; let us for their Sakes enquire a little how things stand in the World, and what we may reasonably expect, as well from the face of things abroad, as at home. Perhaps they may take some Light from our Enquiries, which they would not have before.
As things now present themselves to our View, there seems to be more rational Guesses to be made, and a better Judgment to be form'd from Abroad, than from at Home; at least as far as we may judge from the Outsides and Appearances of Publick Affairs, and as far as we are allow'd to search into them, and pass our Judgment upon them.
'Tis evident the Councils of
Great Britain
tend to Peace, if to be obtain'd with just and honourable Conditions: Peace, if attended with the good Understanding of Princes, and an agreeable Regard to the Treaties and Engagements already entered into, and subsisting between the Nations, to the Advantage of all Sides, and with Support of the Laws, Religion and Liberties of
Europe.
The Government of
Great Britain
quarrels with no body; we desire no War, so that our Neighbours are not oppress'd, our Commerce invaded, new Trades and Correspondencies opened, which were formerly by evident and exclusive Stipulations clos'd and shut up.
Great Britain
is a Trading Nation, and trading Nations never covet War. Peace is a Friend of Commerce, and Trade flourishes under the Banner of the general Tranquility.
But the Government of
Great Britain,
nor of its Allies, who are generally trading Nations too, must not be insulted, must not be run down, much less their Commerce invaded and supplanted. Their Power is always exerted to protect their Trade; 'tis their Business to keep the Seas open, the Ports open, and all the Doors of Commerce open for their Merchants, and for their Ships; and, as I said before, if this cannot be done by peaceable and quiet Means, they must do it by Force, and so they are as ready for War as other People.
'Tis for this that these Nations keep up such a Military Force; such Fleets and such Armies to protect their Trade, to keep all the Back-doors open, to clear the Seas of Pyrates and Privateers, the Sea-Ports from Prohibitions and Reprisals, and to keep the Sea-Ports of all Nations free, and patent for their Ships, and for their Merchants; and if this be obstructed by Force, they must use Force to repel it; if this cannot be obtained without a War, a War must be expected, and to me seems to be unavoidable.
Now the Question before us in the present Case is very short; Do the combin'd Nations, who seem now to oppose the Treaty of
Hanover,
seek to invade the Commerce of
Great Britain,
or do they not? Do they seek to undermine and supplant us, or no? Do the
Ostend Company,
under the Imperial Eagle, invade our
East-India
Trade, or do they not? Do they fit our Ships for Parts, which by several Treaties and Agreements they are obliged not to do, and do not use to fit out Ships for? Do they trade to Places whither they ought not, even by Agreement, to Trade? and is this done by Force, and with Menaces of a Continuance of such Trade, and of resenting the least Opposition to it? If this be so, then I think no Man of Trade need to enquire whether we shall think fit to renew a War for the Recovery of the Trade, seeing the War is begun already by these Aggressions and Invasions.
All the Intervals of Peace which we seem to have had, were obtained by the Sword. The first War between
Holland
and
Spain,
which held forty Years, was closed by the Peace of
Munster,
in which the Rights of Commerce, as well as of Government, were all adjusted, settled and determin'd, and have remained so peaceably ever since, in most Parts on that side the World. If these Rights of Commerce are invaded, you need ask no Questions about it, the War is begun there. Besides this, the several Treaties with
Spain,
and between
Spain
and
France,
have generally adjusted the Commerce, as well as the Possession of the several Countries; and the settling of Trade has been to these Nations as Essential, as the settling of Peace, and was always made a Part of it.
The Conditions on which the
Netherlands
have been assigned to this or that Prince, have been always settled and adjusted by the several Powers, with suitable Reserves to Trade, such as serv'd for a Guarantee of the Commerce on either Hand: By these Treaties such and such Prohibitions have been taken off and laid on, by which the Interests of Trade on either of their Boundaries have been preserv'd and taken care of.
If the Faith of Treaties is to be preserv'd inviolable in Matters of Peace and War, in Matters of Government and Dominion, in the Rights of Possession, and the Claims of Sovereignty, and not in Matters of Trade; why are the Affairs of Commerce, and the free Intercourse of the Subjects one with another, mention'd in these Treaties? Why are the Liberties and Restrictions of Trade stipulated among other things in those Treaties? They are not Articles made on purpose to be broken; there is no Reserve made against them, no Exception; 'tis no where said that the Breach of those Clauses shall not be taken for a Breach of the Peace.
On the contrary, those Articles of Commerce have all along been looked upon as Essential to the good Understanding between those reconciled Nations as any of the rest, and the Breach of them is generally one of the first things complained of.
Upon this Foot then I take the Liberty to say the War is begun already; for the Enemy have invaded us, and refused to put a stop to their Invasions. I am told that the
Spaniards
and the
Muscovites
both complain of the
British
Nation's being Aggressors; and that blocking up their Fleets, whether for War or Trade, is an actual Invasion, that lying before their Ports is an act of Hostility, and that in a word the War is begun on this Side.
I am not to enter into a Justification of what they say, but I ballance it with this: Invasion of the Commerce is as much an act of Hostility, strictly, as Invasion of the Land; the Liberties and exclusive Rights of Trade being as much a Part of the Peace, as a Cessation of Hostilities; and if our Trade be invaded contrary to express Stipulations, the Peace is broken. As for our Squadrons appearing ready to keep the Peace, where apparent Preparations are made to break it, it may be complain'd of, and they do make some Noise about it; but I cannot see how they can make that Part be called an Act of Hostility.
If the
British
Squadron lay off of
Revel,
or any where else on the
Russian
Coast, demanding an Answer to the Enquiries made concerning their Preparations for War, and that they would explain themselves upon the Subject of their fitting out a Fleet in time of profound Peace, it is no more than what has been usual in all Ages, when Princes and Powers make Preparations of War, while their Neighbours are all at Peace with them: For Example;
When the
Dutch
in a time of profound Peace fitted out a Fleet of sixty Men of War for the Expedition of the then Prince of
Orange
into
England,
the King of
France
ordered his Minister at the
Hague
to ask the Meaning of it, and to threaten the
States,
that if it was meant against the King of
England,
he (the King of
France
) should take it as a Declaration of War against himself.
Now if it be objected that this was done by an Ambassador, not by a Fleet; 'tis answer'd, The
French
King indeed had not a Fleet at that time, but he threatned them directly with an immediate War, which was the same thing; and as soon as it appeared that the Design was against the King of
England,
he drew his Armies down to the Frontiers of
Holland,
and hovered about them, (the same thing as blocking up a Port) and at last took the Field publickly, and began an open War.
I might give a great many more Examples of the like, but this is sufficient. The Preparations for War made by the Court of
Petersburg,
their fitting out a Fleet, and drawing down an Army to the Coast, gave sufficient Reason to their Neighbours to ask the Meaning of it: And to what Purpose was an Enquiry at such a Distance, without a Force sufficient to act as Occasion should require, and as the Answer that was to be receiv'd should direct?
Had the Answer been Satisfactory, 'tis probable the
British
Squadron had return'd sooner; but as the Answer was not so Satisfactory, the Fleet continued there waiting the Event; and where's the act of Hostility in all this? I see nothing but what is usual in the ordinary Practice of Princes; much more was it necessary at this time on many Accounts, too long to enter upon here.
Nor is the Resentment which we hear of on the other Side, the least Discovery of the good Effect of those Measures. No doubt it was a Disappointment to the great Designs of the
Muscovite
Empress; put a stop to the Enterprizes just ripe to be begun, and has shut up all the secret Resolves of the
Russian
Cabinet; so that we know nothing of the Scheme they had laid, other than we are left to guess at by the Nature of the thing, and by the Apprehensions and Jealousies which those Preparations raised in the Councils of their Neighbours; Some of which had certainly before now been engaged in a War with the Empress of
Muscovy,
or at least with the Duke of
Holstein,
in whose Behalf all these Preparations seem to have been made.
As to the
British
Squadron in the
West-Indies,
who block up the
Spanish
Plate-Fleet at
Porto Bello,
and which the Enemy complain of as an act of Hostility, and upon which they pretend the War is begun on this Side; the same Argument, and the same Example fully answer it: The blocking up the
Muscovite
Fleet with which it was aparent they designed to begin a War, and blocking up the
Spaniard
's Money, without which we know they are but ill able to begin, much less to carry on a War, seem to me to be the very same thing, and that with no Difference at all, except only the Variation of the Circumstance, and calling the Plate-Fleet an Army, an Alliance and a Confederacy of Armies, drawing together for a War; all which they indeed are in Effect; for Money appropriated for War, is War in Embrio, 'tis all that Fleets and Armies are, or may be supposed to be in Design; and it would soon show it self, had the
Spaniards
those Sinews to strengthen their Councils with, and to pursue the Measures which they have visibly engaged in.
So that in all these things 'tis evident
Great Britain
has only acted by way of Prevention, and has hitherto only held the Hands of the quarrelling Powers, and said to them;
'Ye shall not fall out; if ye will make Peace, be quiet, and accommodate things reasonably, well and good, but quarrel you shall not, and fight you shall not.'
If this has been spoken something Magisterially, and with an Air of Influence, as if we had Power to command them to be quiet; I say, If it has, (I do not say it has) 'tis our Felicity, 'tis
Great Britain
's Glory, that she is in a Condition to enforce her Proposals, tho' of Peace, with a hand of Power; seeing still that Power is exerted but for the Good of Mankind, and to keep the World quiet: 'tis a kind of Imitation of Heaven, who, tho' its Pleasure is enforc'd as a Command, yet it is so for the apparent Good of the World, that they can find it no Grievance to obey.
But our Enemies, they say, take this for an Act of Hostility, that the War is begun by us, and so conclude that they will carry it on as a War in other Places; adding, that we may depend it must be a War, unless the Restraint upon their Plate-Fleet be taken off; if so, then the Question is answer'd, for we see no room to believe the Restraint will be yet taken off, nay I must grant that we can see no reason for it.
This being the true State of the Case, I think the People, who I say should be inform'd, need not wait for any further Information, but may, without any Breach of Prudence, act as if a War was in View; I will not say Inevitable, because many things may intervene, but Probable; and that so probable, that if they are deceived, and run any Hazards on the contrary Presumption, it must be their own Fault.
CHAP. III.
Of the Parties who in Case of a War are like to form the several Interests, and in particular the
Hanover
and
Vienna
Alliances.
THE Probability of a Rupture somewhere or other being thus settled, it will be very agreeable to the Age, if we could determine where it is likely to happen; and this is our next Work: In order to which I shall endeavour to make some Judgment upon the foot of the common Observation only, for I pretend to no Cabinet Informations.
The truest way to state the Case, is to cast up the Account of Strength on both Sides; or, in the Terms of our Vulgar
English, See who and who's together.
The Heads of the Parties seem to be collected under the ordinary Acceptation of the
Hanover,
and the
Vienna
Treaties.
On the Side of the
Hanover Treaty,
I suppose the following Powers either actually or publickly engaged, or expected to be so; as for those who are still intriguing on either Side, we shall let them alone 'till we hear farther.
Declar'd
Great Britain.
France.
The
States.
The Kings of
Denmark
Sweden
and
Sardinia
Expected, and even depended upon as certain
The Government of
Hanover
and
Lunenburgh,
&c. certain.
The King of
Prussia,
not certainly known.
Neuter.
Portugal
Lorrain
Venice
Genoa
Tuscany
On the Side of the
Vienna
Treaty.
Declar'd
The
Emperor.
The King of
Spain.
Declar'd
The
Czarina
The King of
Poland
Expected, and I suppose depended upon, as above.
The Electors of
Saxony
Bavaria
Palatinate
Cologn
Mentz
Tryers
Expected, and as is reported actually come in.
Expected.
Duke of
Parma
Duke of
Modena
The King of
Prussia,
as above, not certainly known.
Having thus stated the Powers, it would be natural to examine a little the Occasion of the supposed Differences, and which, in case of a War, may in some sense be called the Quarrel.
As to any Private or Personal Piques and Resentment which may add to the Grounds of the Quarrel, and may give Jealousies on either hand among the Princes concern'd, tho' I might take notice of several almost among them all; such as the sending home the
Infanta
of
Spain,
espousing King
Stanislaus,
the Affair of
Thorn,
the espousing the Duke of
Holstein,
the Succession of
Tuscany,
with several others nearer Home, which I could enter into the Debate of, I purposely omit them here; being, as is said before, resolved to give no Offence; and as I am speaking without Doors, I shall confine my self to such Things as Present to common Observation only.
The secret, and at that time surprizing Alliance, clapt up on a sudden, between the Courts of
Vienna
and of
Spain,
and which is therefore call'd
the Treaty of Vienna,
was the first thing that gave Umbrage to the Protestant Powers of
Europe;
Particularly they seem'd to be alarm'd at some secret Articles which were not at first made Publick, or communicated to them, when the rest of the Treaty was notified by the Ministers of the Parties concern'd.
Upon the publishing this Treaty, and the said Powers of
Spain
and
Vienna
appearing busily employ'd to engage other Powers to come into it, as an Alliance or Confederacy; his
Britanick
Majesty, being then in
Germany,
thought it time also to draw together the several Powers in other Interests, to form an opposite League or Alliance; which Alliance is said to be wholly Defensive, and therefore entirely Pacific, being form'd merely in order to balance the said Treaty of
Vienna;
and this is called the Treaty of
Hanover;
into which the Neighbouring Powers mention'd above, were invited to join also.
The first and most pointing Clause, which appeared in this new-concerted Alliance or Treaty of
Vienna,
and which gave Umbrage to the said opposite Powers, was a conceded Liberty of Commerce granted by
Spain
to the Subjects of the Emperor, to carry on a Trade to the
East
and
West-Indies;
not only injurious to the several Nations of
Great Britain, France,
and the
States-General,
but directly contrary to, and inconsistent with, several solemn Treaties and Conventions actually subsisting between those several Powers, and on the Conditions of which the Emperor enjoys the Possession of the Country, in which this Liberty of Commerce is made use of.
This the Members of the said
Hanover
Alliance insist, is an Invasion of their Rights, and a manifest Breach of the said subsisting Treaties and Conventions; and have not been wanting in all possible, tho' yet peaceable Applications, at the Court of
Vienna,
in order to convince his Imperial Majesty that the said Commerce, and particularly the
Ostend
Company, erected and carried on in consequence of that conceded Liberty, is a Breach of the Publick Faith engaged in those Treaties, and an Invasion of the Rights and Properties of the said Powers, and representing that they could not on any Terms consent to its being carried on.
These Applications have been hitherto in vain, or at least unsuccessful; both the Courts of
Vienna
and
Spain
refusing to yield to the just Demands of the
Hanover
Allies; they at the same time seeming rather to resent, than comply with those Demands, and to arm and draw together their Interests, strengthning themselves by farther and farther Alliances, and carrying on already a kind of War of Negotiation, in order to appear formidable, and to be really so in case of a Rupture; menacing the Allies with their intended Attacks of some of the said
Hanover
Allies in
Flanders,
in
Germany,
or in the
Baltick.
These things have justly moved the said
Hanover
Allies to Arm also both by Sea and Land; and not only by powerful Fleets to appear at the several Ports where such Powers have been drawing together to carry on their Designs, but have, by the Awe of those Fleets, kept the said Powers from making any Attempt, and from breaking the Peace by the Invasion of their Neighbours, as they most certainly designed to do.
On the other Hand, a Squadron has been sent to the Coasts of
America,
as well to bring off the Ships which are, in the Faith of former Treaties, Trading within the Dominions and in the Ports of
Spain;
as to put a Stop, for the present, to the
Spanish
Plate-Fleet coming away. And all in pursuit of the same Pacifick Measures; that
Spain
seeing how impracticable it is for them to carry on that Important Commerce, without a good Understanding with the more powerful Nations of
Great Britain, France,
and
Holland,
may be prevail'd with, if possible, to continue their Peaceable Dispositions, and preserve the General Tranquility of
Europe.
How far these Steps, which have been visibly taken to prevent a War (not to Excite it) have been Successful, and how they are resented by the several Powers, whose Designs are probably cross'd and defeated by them; and whether those Powers, being convinc'd of the Necessity of Hearkning to peaceable Proposals, are likely to comply; or whether pretending to be Insulted and Injured by those Measures, they breathe out Resentment, Revenge and War; this is what lies before us to Enquire.
And here, as I profess to be speaking as
without Doors
only, I must content my self to ground all the Reasonings and Inferences which I shall make use of in this Discourse, from the publick received Reports of Things; at least, such as are Confirmed by repeated Advices, are generally received for Truth, and have not as yet been Contradicted or Disputed; without pretending, or indeed having any Occasion to pretend, to Secret Intelligence, Private Information, or knowing any thing which should not be known.
Nor in the Case before me is there any Occasion for enquiring into Secrets, or looking farther than to what appears. For, to do Justice to the
Hanover Allies,
they seem to be above all Disguises in the Case. They are Acting above Board; and the World is left to judge of the Reason and Justice of their Proceedings. The Matter is Short, and Open. They desire Peace; that is evident by the Measures they have already taken to preserve it. They are content with every thing standing upon the ancient Foot. They demand that the subsisting Treaties and Conventions be duly Executed; and upon this they Insist. If it be quietly comply'd with, Peace is the Consequence: If not,
Pax Quaeritur Bello.
And this is the Reason, why (as I said before) this is not the Place for the Impatient People to have their Question answered. If they ask us here, Whether Peace or War? We Answer, with the Story in the Gospel, The Emperor is of Age,
Ask him:
The King of
Spain
is of Age,
Go and Ask him.
They are to decide the Case; for the Offer of Peace is to them. And, as they may accept it if they please, they are the only People that can tell whether they will accept it
('till they are Box'd into it)
or no.
Not that this is like to be long the Case neither, nor is it reasonable it should be so; for if they stand out too long; if they reject the Peace, while it is a Peace subsisting, and suffer or leave Things to come on to Extremities; when once that Peace is broken, and they have pull'd the House down upon their Heads, they must get out of the Rubbish as they can: The Allies are not oblig'd to give them the same Terms at last; or to stand always Tendering and Offering the Peace, when they may have been put to Five or Ten Millions
Sterling
Expence, to beat them to it.
But of this in its Place.
I return to the Point in Hand,
viz. The Present Face of Things,
as they appear to be, and as by the uncontroverted Accounts from all Parts we believe them to be.
1. The
British
Squadron under Sir
Charles Wager
have been in the
Baltick;
they have pass'd by
Denmark,
shewn themselves to
Sweden,
and, as it may be call'd, have block'd up
Revel
and
Petersburgh,
'till the Season for Action being over, the
Muscovites
can do nothing on that Side.
2. By this Aggression, all the mighty Designs of the
Czarina,
Empress of
Muscovy,
which (as Fame says) were very Considerable, and would have broken the Peace of Christendom, have been Interrupted and Disappointed. Her embarking an Army in Aid of the Duke of
Holstein,
to recover his Dominions from the
Danes:
Her sending, or, as some say, Selling a Squadron of Men of War to the
Spaniards,
to strengthen their Naval Power: And her other Nameless Designs, whatever they were, have been all render'd Abortive. Her Majesty's Navy, however Formidable, or talk'd up as if they were so, have been Aw'd, kept in Port, and been able to do nothing; no, not so much as to go home again to
Cronslot,
'till the
English
Fleet thought fit to come away, the Season for Action (as above) being over. All this we allow to be true in Fact; and the Consequences have appeared as visible as the Thing it self: For, Peace, in all those Parts of the World where the War was likely first to break out, has been Preserv'd; the
Danes
are secur'd in the Interest of the
Hanover Treaty;
and the
Swedes
brought off from the other Side, when it was suppos'd they were just upon the Point of Engaging in the Treaty of
Vienna;
or in an Alliance with the Emperor, little better than the other.
How the
Muscovites
will proceed in Consequence of this Transaction; whether the
Czarina,
made sensible how utterly uncapable she is to carry on any of her vast Design, for disturbing the Peace of
Europe,
will comply, and come into the Pacifick Offers of the
Hanover Allies:
Or whether her Majesty, full of Resentment and Anger, at being thus overpowered, will struggle (however vain) to pursue her first Designs; that remains to be discovered by Time. And there (as I said) our impatient Enquirers must go, with their Question about
Peace
or
War.
Her
Czarian
Majesty
is of Age, ask Her.
I cannot but put one Speculation here into the Hands of our Politicians, upon this Subject of the
Muscovite
Fleet, and let them consider of it. The late
Czar
had rais'd his Naval Power, considering its Beginning, and the few Years it has been in Being, to a kind of a Prodigy.
A
Muscovite
Fleet, a Thing the World never heard of before, seemed to appear in the
Baltick,
like a Comet in the waste or Starry Spaces; or like the new Star in
Cassiopeia
's Chair, for all the World to wonder at. That such a Thing was never heard of before, is most certain. The whole
Moscovite
Empire never were Masters of one Ship of War before; no, nor, notwithstanding the vast Extent of their Dominions, had the
Czar,
or any of his Ancestors, ever one Ship they could call their own, in any Part of the World, that I have ever heard or read of, except at
Arch-Angel.
It was but in the late King
William
's Time that the
Czar
himself turn'd Ship-Carpenter, and work'd Journey-work for the
States-General.
Having in Disguise (so History assures us) Enter'd himself in some of the Building Yards in that Country; Work'd hard; Earn'd his Pay; and Receiv'd his Wages.
There he bought the first Ship he ever had; and now they talk of a Royal Navy, Ships of 80 to 90 Guns; and of bringing out 50 Men of War of the Line. In a Word, neither the
Swede
or
Dane
are able to look them in the Face. Nay, 'tis doubted, whether both together wou'd venture it, if the
English
and
Dutch
were to stand and look on.
And yet all this while (which is the Thing I mention it for) it is not yet tryed, to this Day, whether, notwithstanding all their Ships, they dare Fight, or no. Nor do I find, or can learn, that whether Separately, or Together, they ever yet Fir'd one Broad-side in Earnest, since they had a Ship.
That they were at first well Mann'd, when the Ships were but few, is very certain; and they had Seamen of all Nations in their Pay. Their Ships were Commanded by
Dutch,
and
Scots,
and
English;
and most of their Officers were such also. But now the Number of their Ships is increas'd, and they have Seamen of their own, such as they are: But how they will behave, or whether they have either Skill or Courage to Fight, none yet knows. And the World cannot but be a little Curious to know how it would be. It is indeed my Opinion, they would make but very sorry Work of it. But 'tis strange, that no Accident should happen in all this Time, to give them an Occasion to show, whether they can Fight, or not, and what may be expected of them! Time alone must give us the Experiment, and make the Discovery. But this is a Digression.
3. Another
British
Squadron, under Admiral
Hosier,
being dispatch'd in the very Critical Juncture of the
Spaniards
expecting their Galeons, has been sent to the Gulph of
Mexico;
and shewing themselves on the Side of
Cuba,
and near the
Havana,
stood over to the
Isthmus
of
America,
and to
Porto Belo,
Posting themselves at the Islands call'd the
Bastimento's,
a Road which commands the Entrance into
Porto Belo.
Here the Galeons were Unloading, and here they were to take in Twenty-six Millions of Pieces of Eight in Specie, besides other Goods: The said Galeons are still block'd up in that Port, and cannot put to Sea; to the inexpressible Mortification and Disappointment of the
Spaniards;
who, for want of that Treasure, are in no Condition in
Old Spain
to carry on their secret Designs, pay their promis'd Subsidies to the Emperor; and, in short, kindle the Flame of War in
Europe. May they be still so disabled.
4. At the same Time, a Third Squadron, said to be intended to the
Mediterranean
Sea, has been kept Cruising and Plying, off and on, upon the Coast of
Spain;
and is now at
Gibraltar,
ready to Intercept (if it comes in their way) the other Plate Fleet, or the other Part of the Plate Fleet; which, coming from
La Vera Cruz,
with Fifteen Millions of Silver more, is arriv'd at the
Havana.
But having Intelligence (as we suppose) from
Europe,
have landed that Treasure there, and laid by the Ships, not thinking fit to venture any farther; By both which Incidents, the
Spaniards
are depriv'd of the Return of Forty Millions of Pieces of Eight in Bullion, and about Five or Six Millions in Merchandise. And thus stand Affairs on the Side of the
Hanover Treaty.
Let us now look a little on the other Side. And how does the
Vienna Treaty
or Party proceed? How do they take all these Disappointments? And what are they like to do, as to Peace or War, upon the Resentment?
In their Endeavours to strengthen themselves, by other and farther Alliances, they have not been Idle, that must be granted; they have not been wanting to themselves. If we may believe what their own People acknowledge, they have left no Stone unturn'd to draw off, if possible, the Court of
France
from the
Hanover Treaty;
and to prevent the King of
Sardinia
joyning in with it; but have miscarry'd in both. The First of these seems to be the greatest and most essential Disappointment of all the rest; and which abundantly shows, how Impracticable it is, to bring the Interests of
France
and the Empire, or of
France
and
Spain,
to Unite together. No, notwithstanding a Prince of the House of
Bourbon
enjoys the Crown of
Spain,
uninterrupted, and in full Peace.
But that by the way.
This Attempt, as it was of the utmost Importance to the Imperial Court, so I suppose I may obtain your Belief, when I say the Popish Clergy have not been wanting to use their utmost Interest at the Court of
France
in favour of it; and, if possible, to bring the Councils of
France
to favour the Happy Juncture (as they call it) of bringing about a Religious War; and for bringing the two Treaties of
Hanover
and
Vienna
to be entirely a
Protestant
Alliance, and a
Popish;
that so the Article of Religion might have been brought in, as the chief Matter to be Fought for.
But they have not been able to do it, tho' a Church-man fits at the Head of Affairs in
France,
and a Cardinal is their Prime Minister. So true is the modern Proverb in
France,
That
All the
French
Fools are dead.
So apparent is it, that tho' the
French
are, as a People, not only
Papists,
but have been Persecutors; yet, as a Government, they are no Slaves to the Church.
That the King of
Sardinia
is as good as lost to them also, appears by the
Imperialists
Arming in the
Milanese;
Fortifying
Novara;
and ordering 20000 Men to be drawn together upon the first Notice; which (as they write from thence) will advance, as soon as they have a certain Account of the King's having Signed the Treaty of
Hanover.
It might have been of Use here, to take Notice, How much it would be to the Advantage of the
Vienna Alliance,
if they had been able to have drawn off the King of
Sardinia.
But this is a Subject too tedious for this Tract. I hear, however, that the Court of
Vienna
exclaim loudly at the great Ingratitude (as they call it) of that King, who,
they say,
owes his Crown and particularly the Deliverance of his Capital City of
Turin,
to the
Imperialists;
that These travers'd the whole Breadth of
Italy,
in that Glorious March of the Imperial Army, to raise the Siege; and gave the
French
the greatest Overthrow they ever receiv'd in all the War, except
Blenheim
only; and all to save Him from Imminent Destruction, which had been otherwise Unavoidable. But I shall reserve that Part to an Article by it self; when I may have Occasion to speak of the Gratitude of Princes, for Favours receiv'd; and of
Imperial Gratitude,
among the rest.
Nor shall I enter here into the Measures taken by the Court of
Vienna,
to bring off (if possible) a certain Powerful
Protestant
Prince, from the Alliance of
Hanover;
in which, 'tis nois'd, that they have had at least some Prospect of Success. But this Part being not yet so publick, or so perfectly known, nor the Particulars of their Success (whatever it is) so Visible, either in Fact, or in Consequence, as it is probable they may soon be, I refer it to Time.
That the
Imperialists
have engaged the Electors of
Bavaria
and
Cologn,
and the Elector
Palatine,
and are not in doubt of
Saxony,
may, for ought we yet see, be true: And the Alliance of those Princes (especially of Two of them) are not Inconsiderable. But 'tis as certain, that the Motions even of the best of those Princes (if not of all the rest) depend so much upon
Spanish
Money, which seems at present very remote, that the Success of those Things seems very Doubtful upon that Account. And even the Emperor, however Powerful, may find it difficult to Act in a vigorous Manner, for want of those Sinews of War, which they expected from
Spain.
Were all these Things duly Weigh'd, and fairly and impartially Judg'd of, common Reasoning would seem to tell us, there could be
no War
in View; that the
Imperial
and
Spanish
Councils could not be so Weak, so Infatuated, and so Blind to their true Interest, as to run themselves into a War, so surrounded with Difficulties; and against Enemies so perfecty well Furnish'd with every Thing that these want; so full of what they are so empty of; and so ready for Action, tho' so willing to have Peace.
But, What will not Pride and Passion drive Men to? And how Deaf are even the Wisest Princes and States, to the Importunities of their own Circumstances, when their Ambition and their particular Passions hurry them on?
Under all the Pressures, which 'tis apparent the Principal Branches of the
Vienna
Alliance are embarrass'd with, and notwithstanding all the Difficulties they struggle with, yet we see them Haughty; Menacing the other Allies, raising Forces, Filling up their Regiments, Storing Magazines, Drawing Troops to the Frontiers; and, in a Word, (as it is usually express'd) Talking of nothing but War.
Their Generals are Named for the Command of their Armies, in several Places where they are to Act; as in
Flanders, Italy,
and (as some say) at
Gibraltar.
The Emperor demands a new Levy of 6000 Men, say some Accounts, 10000, say others, of the States of the Lower
Austria;
and mentions the Occasion of it; namely, to Oppose the Designs of those that would disturb the Peace of his Dominions; that is to say, to maintain the
Ostend
Trade, and the Alliance with
Spain.
And thus stands the Case on the
Imperial
Part of the
Vienna Alliance.
We shall see more of it presently.
CHAP. IV.
Of the Adverse Powers falling upon the
British
Commerce. That Invading our Trade, is Invading our Property; breaking the Peace: And so the War may be properly said to be begun. A Word or two, how Weak, and Foolish, the Attempts this way are; and how easy it is to Disappoint them.
THE Politicks of the Powers mentioned above, in Forming their Interests and Alliances, have been mention'd; and, in that Part, they may be said to Act with some Council. If they had acted with the same Prudence, in some other Parts of their Measures, I am of Opinion we should indeed have had no Quarrel at all; that is to say, they would have given the Allies no Occasion of a War; no, notwithstanding their New
Vienna Treaty.
But that which more particularly calls for our Attention, in the Conduct of these Powers, is their falling upon Trade, and the
British
Commerce in particular. And this, tho' they are able to do but little in it, to any Purpose, or at least have done but little in it yet; I say, this shows the reigning Disposition among them, to insult, injure, and affront his Majesty, and his Allies, and wound their Interest in every Place where it is Valuable; so (if possible) to retaliate what they call our Interrupting their Commerce at
Porto Belo.
In Prosecution of this weak Project (which seems, indeed, as foolish as it is forward) they have mutually made some little Essays. I shall mention the Facts first, and then the Views of the Contrivers; their Expectations from them, and the Meaning of them, so far as they may be allowed to have any Meaning; which I think indeed will appear very Empty and Weak, and unlikely to Succeed, or answer their End.
The first Step was made by the Emperor, in Prohibiting the Sale of the
English
Manufactures at the Fair of
Messina.
As to the generous Part of this Piece of Management, it had, indeed, something very Extraordinary in it; particularly that the Emperor, that very Emperor, for whose Service and Assistance his Majesty sent an
English
Squadron, to drive away the
Spaniards,
and to keep the Sea clear, for his recovering the same City of
Messina,
and that whole Island; which
English
Squadron continuing in that Part of the World so long, and at so great an Expence of the
British
Treasure, made way for the Conquest of
Sicily;
and without which the
Spaniards
would never have been Beaten out of it. I say, that the same Emperor should be the first of all the Princes of
Sicily,
that should prohibit the
English
Commerce there, and fall upon the Trade and Interest of his Benefactors!
Nor could there be any Pretence of the Subjects Benefit, in this Prohibition. No
Sicilian
or
Italian
Manufacture had been substituted in the Room of the
English;
or which the
English
could be said to be Injurious to. Nor was any such Reason given, or pretended to be given, for it, that I have yet met with; or any Other; only, That such was his Imperial Majesty's Pleasure.
On the contrary, even the Subjects themselves Remonstrated against it (as I have been Informed) as prejudicial to their own Commerce.
The farther Prohibition of the
English
Manufactures in the Imperial Hereditary Countries, and Proclaimed by Sound of Trumpet at
Lintz
and
Vienna,
tho' it has the specious Pretence of being done in Favour of their own Manufactures, and at the Request of a Company Established by the Emperor, for carrying on the Woollen Manufacture there; yet it manifestly pointed at the Commerce of
England
in general; several Manufactures being mentioned in the same Prohibition, which their own Company do not pretend to make, or to make any other that can serve in their stead; as appears by the Remonstrances of the Merchants and Tradesmen of the neighbouring Provinces in his Imperial Majesty's Dominion, made publick with the other.
But to leave these things, which, as I said, are as weak and impotent as they appear to be piquant, and as I might say, malicious; we come next to the King of
Spain
's Grant of a Trade to the Emperor's Subjects to the
East
and
West-Indies;
a Trade which the
Spaniards
have, 'till now, been so jealous of, that they have with great Strictness excluded all other Nations from it: But now as an Introduction to this Trade, they have set up an
East-India
Company at
Ostend,
who have already carried on a Trade to
India,
and even to
China,
to the manifest Prejudice of the Allies; and this in a Country conquered for the Emperor by the Arms of those very Nations which are now injured by it: and which Trade is expresly contrary to and inconsistent with all the Treaties and Conventions upon the foot of which the Emperor enjoys the Dominion of those Countries, and of the very Port of
Ostend
it self.
Will any Man ask, after this, whether these Powers acting thus, intend a War? Invading our Commerce, is invading our Property; especially where the exclusive Right to that Commerce is expresly stipulated; and invading a Nation's Property is a War begun. As Treaties of Peace commence an Amity and Accord between Nations who were before at War, so avowed Breaches of those Treaties put an end to that Amity, and,
ipso facto,
commence a War.
It is true, in most Treaties of Peace, and where a continued Amity is designed, there is usually a Clause mentioning, that if any casual Contravention of those Articles shall happen on either side, on Complaint made, Commissioners on both Sides shall meet to settle and adjust the Grievances, and Satisfaction shall be made; so that such Contravention shall not be deemed as a Breach of the Peace, or any Reprisals be used, unless the said Satisfaction be first deny'd.
But have not frequent Representations, Memorials, and Complaints been made at the Courts of
Vienna
and
Madrid
against this open Infraction of a Treaty, without being able to obtain any Redress? but on the contrary, several haughty Expressions been heard of, as if the Emperor was at Liberty to invade any Part of the Commerce of his Neighbours, and to break in upon the most solemn. Treaties and Conventions, in what Manner and at what Time he pleases; and, as may be said, take the Bread out of the Mouths not of private Persons only, but even of Nations and incorporated Societies of Trade, at whatever Expence and Hazard those Societies and Companies have been established?
This Method seems to leave the Allies no other Remedy but that of Force. Trading Nations are obliged to defend their Commerce. If others pretend to interrupt it, these think themselves engaged to enquire into those Interruptions, and remove them. If the Doors of our Commerce are shut, we must open them; if it is done by rigorous Usage of our Merchants, new Impositions or Prohibitions, the Government always has thought fit to espouse the Merchants, preserve them from injurious Treatment, and to concern themselves to obtain Right to be done; and have, as we may say, made the Case of their Merchants their own.
We had an Example of this lately, in the present Reign, when an
English
Merchant at
Lisbon
(betrayed by his Agents and Servants there) was seiz'd upon, and his Goods confiscated, or ordered to be so, for a particular Affair of Exporting Money; and tho' the Offence was indeed, strictly speaking, Capital by their Laws; yet, as many of the Effects of Merchants here in
England,
who were innocent of the Fact, were stopt among the rest, and the Person there was a Man of Worth and Consideration, and of a good Character; and especially as it seemed to affect the whole Commerce, His Majesty was pleased to interpose, and procure the Enlargement of the Merchant, and the discharging of the Effects: And the King of
Portugal
listen'd to the powerful Intercession of the King, and passed over the thing; notwithstanding, as I have said, it was a real Offence.
Much more in other Cases, when the whole Commerce is struck at, Trade loaded with new Burthens, new Impositions, and Difference made between the Subjects of one Nation and the Subjects of another: The Governments whose Subjects are so distinguished in those Oppressions, have always thought themselves concerned in the Invasions of their Trade, and have espoused the Interests of their Merchants, and of the Trade, as a publick Concern.
It is alledged in this Case that every Prince or Government has a Right to govern their own Commerce, and make such Prohibitions, or lay such Duties and Imposts upon their Importations, as they think fit; because such Prohibitions chiefly regard the Use and Wearing of such or such Goods by their own People; and it is always the Right of any Government to limit the Usages, Habits, Customs and Apparel of their own Subjects.
The Answer to this is short and direct. It is so, where no former Stipulations, Treaties and Conventions are made to the contrary; but that Right is limited, and ceases, when the said Nation, so loading the Commerce of any other Country, have by Treaty oblig'd themselves expresly not to do it: Then, I say, and in case of such Treaties, the Case alters, and their Hands are tied up, and to do it afterward is an Infraction of the Treaty, and a Breach of the Friendship and good Correspondence established between the two Nations.
This was exactly the Case in the late Disputes which happen'd here, about opening the Trade to
France.
It was urged, that it could not be; that
England
could not take off the high Duties upon the Importation of Wines (in particular) from
France,
unless a Proportion of the Duties upon the Wines of
Portugal
were also taken off; so as that the Duty upon the
Portugal
Wines should be still so much less than the Duties on the Wines of
France.
The Reason of this was, because
England
was under Express Conditions to the contrary in the Treaty of Peace and Commerce then subsisting with
Portugal;
and the Articles of the said Treaty of
Portugal
were produced, wherein it was expresly stipulated as above, that the Duties on
French
Wine should always be so and so limited; and this being found to be true in fact, was admitted as a sufficient Reason why the Commerce of
France
could not be opened as was proposed.
All Breaches of Treaties are Breaches of Friendship, whether they relate to the Peace or Commerce of the Nations; and the Breach of Friendship between Nations is a kind of declaring War in many Respects; and nothing but meer Force and Invasion can be a more manifest Breach of Friendship, than stopping the Intercourse and Correspondence of the Merchants.
Nor is this one of the least, or less important Articles in most Treaties,
viz.
That there shall be a free Intercourse of Trade and Correspondence between the Subjects of either Nation; as may be seen in almost all the Treaties of Peace which have been made among the Nations of
Europe;
and it will be found so in a particular and extraordinary manner in all the Treaties made and now subsisting between
Great-Britain
and
Spain;
and this Particular will be found in those Treaties which is modern and singular, namely, That the Subjects of
Britain
shall be used in all the Affairs relating to Commerce, upon the same foot as the Nations which are most favoured. Which Article was inserted in regard to some Apprehensions that the
French
should be more especially and particularly favoured in the Affairs of Trade, than the
English,
and that they should be distinguished with a Partiality singular, and to the Prejudice of the
British
Commerce.
In case this Partiality should be afterward put in Practice, in case this Correspondence, Intercourse and Commerce be interrupted by the Governour of that Country with whom such a free Intercourse was stipulated, and Prohibitions of the Trade set up; the Peace is so far broken. Suppose, for Example, the Importation of the
British
Manufactures in
Spain
is forbid, and the Use or Wearing them prohibited, which is the severest way of interrupting the Commerce; is not this equally a Breach of the good Understanding and Commerce of the two Nations? Is it not a Breach of the Friendship and free Intercourse between them? and what is this less than a kind of declaring War?
It was the Observation of a wise Man, that the Peace and Friendship of two trading Nations seldom (nay he said Never) continued long, where Commerce remained contraband. 'Tis like two Men pretending to Friendship, yet never speaking to, or saluting, or taking notice of one another upon any Occasion. How long will that continue? How long will such Friendship subsist?
Our Interest is our Trade; and our Trade is, next to our Liberty and Religion, one of our most valuable Liberties; if our Neighbours pretend to shut the Door against our Commerce, we must open it; and that by Force, if no other Means will procure it. To invade our Commerce is to invade our Property, and we may, and must defend it; and therefore I say, to invade our Trade is to begin a War; and will any Man then ask me, whether we shall have
War
or
Peace?
The Answer is Categorical; if they please to leave our Commerce free and uninterrupted, as they found it; lay down their interloping Companies, by which they have begun to invade it; cease their Infractions of the solemn Treaties, and leave our Commerce open, then with some other Concessions all will be well, and I believe we shall have no
War.
On the other hand, Do all those things go on, shall they support their interloping
Ostend
Company; forbid their Subjects wearing and using our Manufacture; and interrupt our Commerce? As
Jehu
said to the King of
Israel
when he met him, and asked,
Is it Peace, Jehu?
he replied,
What Peace, while the Whoredoms of thy Mother Jezabel and her Witchcrafts are so many?
So I say, What Peace, when the Encroachments on our Trade, the Interruptions and Invasions of our Commerce are so many? What Peace, while the Leagues and private Confederacies are so many? Leagues that are so apparently destructive of Peace and good Neighbourhood; Leagues that threaten War, and are an open consolidating of Interests in case of War; Leagues that support Popery and Persecution, and suppressing and murthering Protestant Subjects under Guarantee of Protestant Powers and Princes: Leagues that are in their own Nature tacit Declarations of a warlike Intention. What Peace can there be, while this is the Case?
We have seen frequent Examples upon many, nay almost upon all such Occasions, that when any Princes raise Forts or fortify Towns upon their Frontiers, or re-fortify Towns which have been demolished by Treaties and Confederacies; that such fortifying of Frontiers is taken for an Intimation of War, or at least for a Testimony of unpeaceable and dangerous Designs; and the neighbouring Princes generally take Umbrage at such things; send Agents and Messages to enquire into the Reason of them; declare their Dissatisfaction, and threaten to use Force to put a stop to those Preparations, Fortifications, and repairing of demolished Places.
If the Princes and Powers by whom those Fortifications are made, do not give a peaceable and satisfactory Answer, assign proper Reasons for what they do, and give Assurances that they have no Design injurious to their Neighbours the Complainers, they frequently draw together their Forces, and appear resolved to oblige them by their Power, to give over or demolish again the Works they had begun.
Examples of this are many, and recent in Memory; as the Fortifications which the King of
Denmark
raised at
Husum,
at
Heusden,
and other Places on the Frontiers of
Holstein,
which caused the
Swedes
and Princes of
Lunenburgh
to arm against him, after in vain having desired his
Danish
Majesty to cease his Works and leave the Country open; and this caused an Army of those Powers to assemble and march to the Frontiers, in order to effect it by Force, no other Method proving effectual; upon which ensued the Treaty of
Trav
al,
where the King of
Denmark
yielded, and the F
immediately demolished.
, but more universally known and remembred, w
the
French
attempting to fortify
Mardike,
after the
hing of
Dunkirk,
and to build a Port or Haven with P
s and Sluices there, as before at
Dunkirk.
It was certainly just (and no Nation had any thing to do with it) that the
French
might, and ought to be at Liberty to build Piers and make Harbours, Docks and other things for the Assistance of their Commerce and Navigation in any Part of their Dominions, as much as the King of
England
has a Right to do it at
Dover,
or the
Dutch
at
Sluys.
But if his Majesty had stipulated by a solemn Treaty not to do it, I cannot say it would be equally rightful or just to do it then. So the
French
having positively engaged not to raise any Fortifications at
Dunkirk,
or to restore that Harbour there, or on any Part of the Coast near it, as was the Case in the Treaty of
Utrecht,
that Right to do it ceased, and was anticipated and taken away by the Treaty; for what any Prince or Power have bound themselves not to do, they may be said to have no Right to do.
There are many Examples of the like kind in several other Parts of the World, but these are sufficient.
I might bring this home to the Harbour of
Ostend.
I am not sensible that any Treaty or Convention by which the Emperor enjoys that Port, obliges him not to enlarge it, deepen the Channel, make Piers, Basins, or any thing else, as shall appear for his Convenience, and for the Security of his Merchants and of their Ships: I say I do not know that the Emperor is under any Treaty or Obligation not to do this, and so his ordering these Enlargements are no Contravention of any such Treaty, nor any just Ground of Quarrel or Jealousy; for why should not his Imperial Majesty do every just thing for the Good of his People, the Encouragement of their Commerce, the Security of their Ships, and the like?
But as these Works at
Ostend
are evidently design'd for the receiving and protecting the Ships, encouraging the Trade, and carrying on the new Company's Commerce to the
Indies,
which Trade the Emperor is expresly bound even in the very Tenure of his Possession not to support or carry on, or to suffer to be carried on; then the Case differs exceedingly; and even the fortifying
Ostend,
deepening and enlarging the Harbour, and the like, as mentioned above, is a just matter of Jealousy; and however lawful in itself, yet intimates plainly, that the Emperor and his Subjects are resolved to continue and carry on that Trade, how prejudicial soever to their Neighbours the
English
and
Dutch,
and however it may appear to be inconsistent with the Treaties and Obligations which His Imperial Majesty is bound by, and enjoys the Country by the Stipulation of.
It evidently shews a resolved Temper, a fixed Design and Disposition to continue that Commerce, however injurious to us their Neighbours; and that (if it cannot be otherwise obtained) instead of abating or laying it down, as was expected, and according to the Remonstrances of the Allies, they resolve rather to maintain it by Force; and menacing the Ally'd Powers with their formidable Resentments, pretend to make War upon those that shall interrupt it; as if they were able to Act in the same Hostile manner they talk of, and as if their Power was equal to their Bluster, on those Occasions.
This is what (in our vulgar way) we call
Showing their Teeth;
and could they do no more that way by Land, than they can by Sea, it would merit some vulgar Talking of it. But as they seem to threaten the World with their mighty Forces, and that those Forces are indeed Considerable, at least are far from being Despicable, this is that which tells me there seems to be a Necessity of a War.
The
Flemings
talk big, and say, if the
Dutch
(for Example) date to touch their Ships, and interrupt their Trade, in and to the
Indies;
the Emperor will attack them with all his Forces by Land. That I call War: and that is what I call the Necessity of a War. For it seems not to be expected, that Marine Trading Nations, such as the
English
and
Dutch,
whose Trade to the
Indies
is so considerable, and which the Emperor is by Treaty bound not to Invade, will sit still, and see it Invaded and Insulted. On the contrary, I think they will not, must not, cannot do it.
If then the
Dutch,
&c. cannot, must not, and will not, bear this Commerce; and the Emperor will not, cannot lay it down, and give it over; and threatens them, if they offer to interrupt it: What follows? What is the necessary Consequence, but a War? Nay, What are these Things but a War in Effect, if not in all the Circumstances of it? And where these things are Acted in this Manner, how can any Man make a Question, whether a War will happen, or no?
CHAP. V.
Whether in Point of Right and Wrong we ought or may conclude, that a War ought to be the Consequence of the present Councils in
Europe.
IT is not the most difficult Thing in the World, to make a Judgment of what
may be,
by
what is:
The publick Conduct of Princes and States seldom so effectually disguises their Intentions, but some Rational Observations may be made; some Just Inferences drawn; and some Probable Guesses be made, of what will be the Issue of their Councils.
The present Politicks of
Europe
are indeed more Intricate than ordinary: And yet they are not without evident, visible Marks of the Intention that several Princes and Powers have, or had, to Break the Peace of the World, and invade the
Property
and
Commerce
of their Neighbours, in order to begin a War.
I have already mention'd, that the
Czarina,
or Empress of
Muscovy,
had form'd a Resolution to begin a War, and put and End to the Tranquility of
Europe,
by an Attempt upon the King of
Denmark,
in Favour of the Duke of
Holstein.
I do not say positively it is so; but who can make any Doubt of it? To what Purpose were the Neighbours of that Princess alarm'd in that Manner? And why was the
British
Squadron sent into the
Baltick
to prevent those Attempts, if there was not such an apparent Design? Nor (as I am told) did the Court of
Petersburgh
so much as endeavour to Conceal it; but rather sollicited other Powers to Assist the said Duke, in, what they call'd, Recovering his Inheritance.
Again, who can doubt the Resolutions of the
British
Court (if possible) to Preserve the Peace; keep every one in the quiet Possession of what they held; and tye up every Side to those Terms of Peace which they had already Consented to; when they saw the
British
Fleet block up the Aggressors in their Ports, and put an End to all the violent Measures resolv'd on? (A Testimony also, that such Measures were resolv'd on.)
As to the Justice of the Duke of
Holstein
's Claim to the Possession of his Antient Dominions, I have nothing to do with that here: Be it Just, or Unjust, that they were taken from him; and be it Right, or Wrong, that they are kept from him, that is not the Question to us. But as the
Czarina
Aiding the Duke with a Powerful Army, as was intended, for the Recovery of those Dominions, would necessarily have begun a War, and perhaps embarked several Princes on both Sides, in the Quarrel; so far the Pacifick Powers were justly engag'd to prevent it; and probably may exert themselves in the same, or like manner, to do the like for the future; and that, not only there, but any where else where they find the like Occasion.
Not that
Great Britain
should be always at the Yearly Expence of such a Fleet, to keep the
Muscovite
Fleet within Bounds, and to preserve the Peace of the
Baltick:
But it is to be suppos'd, that the
Swedish
and
Danish
Powers being United, they may at length join their Fleets, and be in a Condition to match the
Muscovite
Fleet, and Command the Sea so, as to keep them up within their Ports, without the Assistance of their Neighbours.
From thence let us consider the Preparations of the Imperialists. Why should I not say, that it is very probable they intend a War, when we have the following Account published in one of our publick Papers, said to be come from the Council of the
States General?
Hague,
Decemb. 17. N. S.
Some Days ago, the Ministers of
Great Britain
and
France
were invited to a Solemn Conference with the
States General;
where their High Mightiness's Deputies opened the Discourse with a Recapitulation of all the Resolutions taken by the States, since their Accession to the Treaty of
Hanover,
that regarded the Military Preparations; to which they added, That since there remained little or no Likelyhood that the Differences between the Contending Powers of
Europe
could be amicably Adjusted during the Winter, the
States
had all the Reason in the World to fear that the Emperor would, in Revenge for such their Accession, begin Hostilities against the Republick; either by Attacking it with open Force, or by stopping the Payment of the Subsidies, stipulated by the Barrier Treaty.
The Reason of my quoting this Speech of the
States
Deputies, is very plain, as the Speech it self is very convincing in the Case before us. If the
States
have all the Reason in the World to fear that the Emperor will begin Hostilities with them, for their Acceding to the
Hanover Treaty;
then we have the same Reason, that is to say, all the Reason in the World, to believe a War will follow. So that there you have the Answer of the
States General
directly to this great Question about the War.
Here is another Thing also advanc'd in that short Speech of the
Dutch
Deputies, which affords us some Foundation for the Arguments already used; where I seem to insist That the
War
is as it were already resolv'd on, if not begun, by the
Imperialists
and
Spaniards,
and by their interrupting and invading our Commerce. The Deputies say,
"They have all the Reason in the World to fear that the Emperor will begin Hostilities against the Republick, either by Attacking it with open Force, or by stopping the Subsidies stipulated by the Barrier Treaty.
Where,
Stopping the Payment
of stipulated Subsidies to the
Dutch
Troops, is call'd a Beginning of Hostilities. And is not then stopping the Course of stipulated Commerce, a Beginning of Hostilities? I cannot refrain saying, I think it is: And,
if so,
then I think the Hostilities are begun, as much as if the Armies were in the Field, or the Fleets engag'd.
But now, as to the Question, as it stands in Point of RIGHT; that indeed differs exceedingly: for 'tis one Thing to ask me, Whether
I believe
the Emperor WILL begin a War, and another Thing, Whether HE OUGHT to do so, or has a just Cause to do it,
or no.
As to the Question, Whether the Emperor
ought
to begin a War? I have two Reasons to give, why I think not; why I think the Emperor ought not to make a War, as well in general, as not in particular, in this Case.
1. Because,
in general,
no War ought to be made among Christians, but upon just and unavoidable Occasion. Had this War been entred upon, only in Support of a Commerce set up upon unjust Foundations, against express Stipulations, and against the Tenor of Conditions on which the very Country came to the Emperor, in which he carries it on; he rather might be said to forfeit by this Encroachment the Right he had, than have a new Right to push on Separate Interests, in Prejudice of others.
2. Because,
in particular,
he is under Special and Personal Obligations to the very Nations who are injured by this Commerce; and that such, as that to them he owes the very Possessions and Dominions which he enjoys, as well in that, as in several other Parts of the World. The
Netherlands
may be said to be their Gift to him; they were gain'd at their Cost, at the Expence of their Blood and Treasure. And tho' it might be call'd his Right, yet ('tis very probable) he had never had the Possession of that Right, if they had not Powerfully supported his Claim, conquer'd the Country by their Armies, put it into his Hand; and obtained the Concession of
France
to it, by the Treaty of Peace concluded at
Utrecht.
GRATITUDE binds Princes as well as private Men; Nations, as well as particular Persons: And such good Offices as these, can never be too much acknowledg'd, or too well requited. To say Kings and Emperors are not bound by such Obligations, is to say Kings and Emperors are not or can not be Good Men, or Honest Men.
GRATITUDE is a Branch of
Honesty;
and it is very hard to say, or even to think, a Man can be Honest that is not Grateful; for as
Gratitude
respects an Obligation past, or a Kindness receiv'd; so it is no more or less, than paying a Debt; and tho' the Debt be not such perhaps as can be demanded by Process (if it were, the Creditor could oblige the Debtor to Payment) yet the Obligation is the stronger. The Man of Honour always thinks himself bound faster by the generous Kindness of his Friend, than by his own Bond, and will more punctually pay a Debt of Honour, than a Debt of Law.
To say a Prince is above all Acknowledgment, and all Returns of
Gratitude,
is to say a Prince is not bound by Principles of
Honour.
Nor can Reasons of State ballance this Principle of Honour, or the Sense of Obligation in a Prince. The late King
Charles
II. and indeed the whole
English
Nation, left a remarkable Testimony of their publick Regard to this Principle of Honour upon Record, even in a National Capacity, which I cannot but mention.
After the Restoration, the
English
Parliament thought it convenient, for the Publick Good, to make several strict Laws against Popish Recusants; and especially against Popish Priests, who were (on the severest Penalties) forbid residing here, and particularly officiating as Priests.
Yet not the King only, but the Parliament it self, in all their Acts, made an Exception for Father
Huddleston
a Priest, nay, a
Jesuit;
in perpetual Remembrance of and
Gratitude
for his Fidelity to the Person of the King, in concealing his Majesty, and assisting to his Escape, even at the Hazard of his own Life, and in Contempt of the Reward of 1000
l.
offered by the Enemy for the Discovery, after the Defeat of the Royal Army at
Worcester.
Here was a Testimony of a Nation's
Gratitude,
and of a Prince's
Gratitude,
and that even when the said Nation was under the most powerful and just Apprehensions of the pernicions Practices of those very Priests, for the perverting both Prince and People to Popery; and when that Prince, as it was said at last, was influenced so far as to be secretly reconcil'd,—
&c.
But GRATITUDE never dyes, and Obligation never ceases; nothing can wear it out of the Mind, where the Mind is once possess'd with Principles of Honour, of Religion, and of Justice: A Man of Honour can no more be Ingrate, than a Man of Honesty can Steal. Ingratitude is hardly to be express'd by any Word worse than it self; and therefore 'twas the Saying of a great Man,
That to say a Man is Ingrate, is to say All of him that is Evil:
Ingratitude being a Complication of almost all Crimes. 'Tis a cancelling all Obligations in the Mind; and harbouring Mischief and Resentment, instead of Affection and a Sense of Obligation.
I have heard from some of our Moralizing, Criticizing Friends, who are fam'd for searching too nicely into Nature's
Arcana,
that it is an Evil rooted in Mankind, to have an Aversion, instead of Affection, where they are over-loaded with Obilgation. That Man, thro' a certain secret Pride natural to him, and introduced by the first Seeds of Degeneracy, constantly hates to be Obliged beyond his Power to make Returns.
That as long as he can balance Accounts, and while he is upon the Square, he will be an entire Friend, and act as such upon every Occasion; nay, he will be pleased with the Occasion of over-paying the Debt: But when he sees a Weight of Obligation flowing in too heavy for him to throw off, that the Debt is too great to be paid, and that he can never hope to balance the Account, he grows sick of the Obligation; and consequently throwing off all thoughts of Return, Hatred comes in of Course; for the Man hates to see the Person to whom he must be always making Acknowledgments.
I will not say how far I am or am not of this Opinion, in this Case; but I must own, that I can find out no other Way, (or at least no better Way) to account for the Conduct of a certain Prince in the World; I mean as to Obligations laid upon him Personally, as well as in his Publick Capacity, by the
British
Nation.
I remember a small Book, or Pamphlet, published in the Year 1712, Entituled, IMPERIAL GRATITUDE, drawn from a modest View of the Conduct of the Emperor
Charles
VI. and the King of
Spain Charles
III. with Observations on the Difference.
In this Book there is a large Account of Obligations laid on his Majesty
Charles
III. then King of
Spain,
by the late Queen and the
British
Nation; and the GRATEFUL RETURNS made by his Imperial Majesty
Charles
VI. The former taken principally from Acknowledgments under his Catholick Majesty's own Hand; and the rest from the Votes and Orders of Parliament, and other Authentick Vouchers; a few of which may not be improper to be quoted in this Case, because of some additional Articles which
Great Britain
is able to add to the Account, since the Accession of His Majesty King
George.
It is in every one's Memory, how after the Death of
Charles
II. King of
Spain,
the House of
Austria
and the House of
Bourbon
severally claimed the Succession to that Crown; and how the Emperor
Leopold,
then living, causing his eldest Son
Joseph
to Renounce, who, being then King of
Hungaria,
and King of the
Romans,
was presumptive Successor (tho' in Election) to the Empire; declared his Second Son, the then Arch-Duke
Charles,
King of
Spain,
and made Application to the Confederates (then in War against
France
) for their Assistance, and for placing him upon the Throne; for None else could do it.
Let us see in what humble Terms (as to his Grandson) the good old Emperor writes to the Allies, and especially to the Queen of
England.
Take it, Word for Word, from his Imperial Majesty's own Hand. N. B.
The
Emperor
does not give the Title of
Majesty,
but
Serenity,
to any Kings or Queens.
Our said Son would gladly signifie this to your Serenity, and express our Joint
Gratitude
and
Acknowledgment
of it in Person: But since the present Posture of the Common Affairs calls him further, he will perform this in another Method, at his Arrival. But may it please your Serenity, in the mean time, to allow us (since he is to leave us in a few Days) wholly to deliver him over, and to recommend him to your Serenity as to another MOTHER, with Assurance on his Part, That as long as
he Lives,
he shall honour your Serenity with Filial Respect; and that our Family shall ever be obliged to serve your Serenity in the strictest Manner, and in perpetual Gratitude.
Vienna,
Sept. 13. 1703.
Signed LEOPOLD.
'In consequence of this Recommendation (says my Author) the young King is sent by Land from
Vienna
to
Holland,
and passing from thence to
England,
we find him receiv'd with all the Respect and magnificent Bounty, that suited the first Steps taken for his Advancement.
'He had his first Access to the Queen at
Windsor, Dec.
26, 1703. Her Majesty receiv'd him at the Head of the Stairs, where his first Bow seemed (by those that saw it) to signify, that he meant to kiss the Ground at her Majesty's Feet. Then he made the Queen a becoming Compliment, acknowledging his great Obligations to her.
After this, when the said King arriv'd at
Lisbon,
being complimented by Mr.
Methuen, English
Ambassador to the King of
Portugal,
says the same Author,
'His Majesty receiv'd him very graciously, and expressed, in the most obliging Terms, the great Respect and Veneration he hath for her Majesty, and how sensible he is of the great and many Obligations he oweth her; which he hopeth he should be so happy as to be able to return, in such a manner, as might shew the whole World the grateful Sense he should always retain of her Majesty's Kindness to him.'
Here is Part of the Obligation acknowledged to the Queen Personally.
Let us follow his Catholick Majesty into
Catalonia,
and there we find him acknowledging the same Things to the whole
British
Nation, and, indeed, with the same or greater Reason.
He arriv'd at
Barcelona
in
Septemb.
1705, aided by the Confederate Forces; he Lands, takes
Barcelona, Gironne, Lerida,
and
Tortosa;
and, in a Word, the greatest Part of the whole Principality.
In acknowledgment of the great Assistance he receiv'd from this Service, he writes to the Queen a long Letter, throughout which he expresses his Grateful Sense of it; but in particular, as it respects the whole Kingdom, as well as the Queen, he has, among others, this high Expression;
I receive so great an Assistance from your Majesty and your GENEROUS NATION, that I am overcome with your Goodness, and in the greatest Confusion, that I should be the Occasion of so great an Expence for the Supporting my Interest.
And after other lofty Expressions, his Majesty concludes thus;
I am ever, with the most sincere Affection, Respect and Gratitude,
Madam, My Sister,
Your most Affectionate Brother, CHARLES.
From the Camp at
Senia
before
Barcelona,
Octob.
22. 1705.
No body can say but his Catholick Majesty expresses himself here like a Man of Honour, and like a Prince that had on his Mind a deep Impression of what had been done.
Nor can it be denied but that as these Obligations were laid on him, not by the Queen only, but by the whole
British
Nation, the Debt descends with the Crown, and the Gratitude becomes due to His present Majesty in Right of the
British
Nation; and we shall see it still more plainly, when I shall give you the Account of the Blood and Treasure expended by this Nation in particular, for the Service of this very Prince; where we shall find that it cost
England
the Blood of almost sixty thousand Soldiers, and above eight Millions of Treasure to support his Cause in
Spain
only; and that even his being elected Emperor was owing to the powerful Influence of the
British
Interest at that time; all which are at large express'd in the Tract just now quoted,
Pag.
41.
as follows,
viz.
An Account of Troops as well raised in
England
as in
Spain
and
Portugal,
for the Service of King
Charles III,
at the proper Expence, and in the Pay of
England.
 
 
Men.
The First Shipping, 1703.
Shipped from
England
with Duke
Schomburgh
8000
 
Raised in
Portugal
at the
English
Expence
13000
1704.
With the Earl of
Galway
4519
1705.
With the Earl of
Peterborough
5000
 
Ditto
from
Gibraltar
2000
 
Recruits
750
 
More Regiments the same Year
4170
 
Recruits
1240
1706.
With the Earl
Rivers
9359
1709.
This Year
8676
 
Recruits
800
1710.
Sent to
Portugal
8801
 
 
66315
Besides these,
England
Paid, Hired, Raised or Sent at their Proper Expence, the following Troops.
 
 
Men.
1706.
Raised by King
Charles
in
Catalonia
and paid by the Queen of
Great-Britain
6000
 
Form'd there after the Battel of
Almanza
in
English
Pay
2800
 
Paid more from
Italy
6600
1708
Sent from
Italy,
but paid by
Great-Britain
5000
1709
Ditto
4000
1710
Ditto
4690
 
 
29090
 
 
66315
 
 
95405
So that in the whole, here was ninety five thousand four hundred and five Men actually landed in
Portugal
and
Spain,
or raised there, and all paid at the Expence of
Great-Britain.
Well might the King express himself under great Obligations to this GENEROUS NATION.
Let us now see a Sketch of the Expence which
England
was at in particular for this Service; and this we have in the same Tract,
Page
42, taken from the appropriating Votes in the several Parliaments of those Years, as follows:
An Acount of the Expence of the War in
Spain,
as it was published in a Book, Entitled,
Imperial Gratitude,
&c.
 
 
l.
s.
d.
The Alliance with
Portugal
in Behalf of King
Charles
III. was in the Year 1703.
Money for the Service the first Year, there being no Parliamentary Provision
162478
05
02
 
More added to the same Year, provided for by Parliament 1705
68549
19
06
1704
Allowed by Parliament for the War with
Spain,
in Defence of K.
Charles
III.
326481
11
00
 
Expended more the same Year
21659
09
00
1705
Appointed by Parliament for the same Service
476727
15
10
1706
Ditto
726740
15
10
1707
Ditto
998322
11
10
1708
Ditto
1248956
12
02½
1709
Ditto
1217083
00
04
1710
Ditto
1276035
16
02
1711 1712
Not settl'd at the publishing that Book, but the Author takes it by Proportion at
2075000
00
00
 
Total, in Sterling Money,
8,183,035
16
10½
These things, says the Author, would hardly seem creditable, were not the Vouchers ready to confirm the Particulars, and to prove every Part of them; and he adds,
'That after such an immense Expence of Blood and Treasure laid out in his Service, it would have been very Grateful and Honourable, and perhaps but Reasonable, that His Majesty should have written one Letter more, to assure Her Majesty, He will think now of some Means to pay, or secure the Payment of, those immense Sums which the Queen had laid out to assist him.
The same Book gives a particular Account of his Majesty's being besieged in the City of
Barcelona,
and of the Distress he was reduced to; gives Copies of the pressing Letters which the King wrote to Her Majesty for Succours, and the Account of the timely Deliverance obtained by the Assistance of the
British
Fleet and Troops in raising the Siege, and causing the
French
Army to retire with Disgrace; which adds to the Account, and heightens the Obligation that his Majesty acknowledged himself to be under before.
After this, the Death of the Emperor
Joseph
happen'd; and then all the Confederates, but
England
in particular, made the most powerful Instances among the Princes of
Germany
to procure the Election of the King of
Spain;
and carried it for his Majesty against all the Intrigues of the
French
Court, and the particular Application of the Electors of
Bavaria
and
Cologn.
This finished the Fortunes of his Catholick Majesty, and advanced him to the highest Degree of Human Glory that this World can bestow.
Let us cease here a little 'till the Accession of his present Majesty to the Throne of
Great-Britain,
and besides all the Obligations laid on his Imperial Majesty of another kind, of which I have no room to enlarge in this Place, we may at once look into the Quadruple Alliance; a Treaty which, by the Interest and Influence of his
Britanick
Majesty, was calculated for the particular Service of the Emperor; the King of
France
was brought to assist by his Arms to bring the King of
Spain
to hearken to Reason, and to come to the Terms of the Truce, and
Spain
pressed by the Arms of
France
did consent to put an end to the War.
Without the powerful Fleet of the King of
Great-Britain
opening the Sea to the Imperialists, and shutting it up from the
Spaniards,
defeating and taking their whole Fleet, the Imperialists had never been able to have taken the Kingdom of
Sicily:
So that it is to the glorious Arms of His Majesty that the
Spaniards
were driven out of that Kingdom, and the Emperor put in Possession of it.
Now bring all this down to the present State of Things, May we not civilly examine for which of all these Acts of generous Assistance of the
British
Nation, I say for which of them it is that the Court of
Vienna,
or the Emperor, has prohibited the
English
Commerce at the Fair of
Messina;
the very City King
George
may be said to have conquered for him; for which of them he has invaded our
East-India
Trade, and prohibited all our
English
Manufactures in the great Market of
Lintz
by Sound of Trumpet?
May we not say, Is this
Imperial Gratitude?
Is this a suitable Return to His Majesty, and to the powerful Efforts of a Generous Nation, for the Interest and Honour of the Emperor? Is it what His Majesty might reasonably expect, or what the
British
Nation had Reason to look for? Or is this the Way the Princes of that Part of the World pay their Debts of Honour, and balance the great Obligations which they receive from one another? We hope we might say this without Offence.
Let the Language of His late Imperial Majesty's Letters to the late Queen, to the Duke of
Marlborough,
and to the States of
Holland,
at the naming his Grandson to the Succession of
Spain,
and after the Battel of
Blenheim;
and the Language of His present Imperial Majesty when shut up in
Barcelona,
and in Danger of being carried in Triumph to
Madrid,
be all considered, when he was every Hour expecting a general Assault, and begged of Sir
George Rook
to come speedily to his Relief:
I say, let these which are at hand to produce, and which, had I room, I could give you at large, to illustrate this Part, be considered; May we not compare them with the Terms now used in Return to the frequent Memorials and Representations of the
British
and
Dutch
Ambassadors at
Madrid,
claiming a just and friendly Performance, not of Promises only and grateful Remembrances of generous and kind Actions done, but of solemn Treaties and Leagues; Treaties of Peace and Commerce, Friendship and good Understanding, wherein Limits of Trade as well as Dominion are settled and adjusted? Let the haughty Answers and the Expostulations of Resentment, which Fame says were returned by the Court of
V—
to Memorials framed with the utmost Respect, be all Duly considered and compared as above, and what shall we conclude from it; what can we say! except that perhaps this is the Meaning of that hitherto Misunderstood Expression, that difficult and doubtful Thing called IMPERIAL GRATITUDE.
From all which however, we may flatter our selves, that for the future, the
British
Nation and their generous Princes, will consider very well how they oblige Emperors again, beyond their Power of Requital; and how they spend Eight Millions to set a Prince upon a Throne, that shall turn the Arms of that very Power they gave him against the Interest of his Benefactors.
But Heaven, whose Impartial Justice the
British
Nation and their injur'd Sovereign appeal to in all this, will no doubt soon discover its Sentiments of these things; and the Power God has put into his Majesty's Hands can never be better employed, than to humble the Insolence of such Powers, as think themselves above the Natural Laws of Friendship and Gratitude, and regard no Justice, but as it conforms with their Interest, and encreases their Power.
CHAP. VI.
Of the
Spaniards
being Aggressors in the War; their Pretences, how trisling; their Power, how far from being formidable; and of what the Consequences of a War may be, as well to them as to us.
IF we may judge by the Appearance of Things, there are two Articles in this Forwardness of the
Spaniards
to Quarrel, which make it very preposterous on their Side.
First,
That they are as ill able to manage a Quarrel (with
England
especially) as any Nation in
Europe.
Secondly,
They have as little Pretence to make a Quarrel of it.
1. As to their Ability to manage a War with us, I have spoken of it in particular already; and lest I should be told, 'tis time enough to boast
when we put our Armour off,
I am content to stay 'till then; and let the
Spaniards
count their Gain when they have had their Fill of a War, so I say no more of that now.
2. As to their Pretences, or the Causes of Quarrel, I can find but two; that is to say, all that I can meet with on their own Part, or that they so much as pretend to, may be reduced to two Heads.
First,
The Affair of the
British
Squadron lying before
Porto Belo;
or, as they commonly express it, Blocking up their Ports, and in it their Plate-Fleet.
Secondly,
The
English
refusing to restore
Port-Mahon
and
Gibraltar.
As for the First, they make a great Noise of it; complain of its being an Insulting their Coast, an open Violation of Friendship, an Interruption of Commerce, and an Act of Hostility, with much more of that Kind; and upon this we are now told they draw together their Armies, Hover about
Gibraltar,
(tho' they are able to do very little to it) talk of Building new Fortifications to incommode the Bay or Port, buy Ships of War, and, in a word, show by many weak Advances that they resolve upon a War.
Certainly the
Spaniards
have very wrong Notions of their own Strength, or else we are ill inform'd about it; and particularly how ill able they are with all their Strength, tho' it were double to what it is, to annoy the
English,
or defend themselves against us.
That they are not equal by Sea is very evident; 'tis no Boasting to say they cannot look us in the Face upon the Salt-water; all the Naval Force of
Spain,
were it brought together, and had they the greatest Liberty given them they could desire to bring it together, could not fight a Squadron of twenty
British Third Rates;
and this I say is far from being a Bluster, since it was proved at Cape
Passaro,
where the
Spaniards
had the best Fleet, and the biggest Ships that they have ever seen at Sea
of their Own
for a hundred Years past.
What then are the
Spaniards
doing? Do they reflect that
Great Britain, France,
and the
States-General,
the three greatest Marine Powers in the World, are in Alliance, and may come to act in Conjunction in this War, if there was any Occasion for it, against one (alas how Impotent!) fingle Power of
Spain?
Have they considered what they are able to do against Three such Powers United, the weakest of whom are able to blow all the Ships of
Spain
out of the Sea, and make them not dare to stir out of their Ports? What can the King of
Spain,
or the Council of
Spain,
think of such an unequal War? and what Encouragement can their Officers and Seamen have to engage in their Service, or embark in their Ships, where they are so sure to be beaten?
2. Have the
Spaniards
consider'd, that they have a vast unguarded Coast for above a thousand Miles lying upon the Sea, as well on the Side of the Ocean, as in the
Mediterranean;
from St.
Sebastian
at the bottom of the Bay of
Biscay,
to
Viana
on the Edge of
Galitia,
and from the River
Guadiana
on the side of
Andalusia,
to the Mouth of the
Straits,
and thence to the Bay of
Roses,
on the Frontiers of
Rousillon,
in the Dominion of
France.
The Length of this Coast is at least twelve hundred Miles: Not all the Force of
Spain,
nay, scarce all the Men in
Spain,
were they arm'd and form'd into Regiments, could guard such an extended Coast, so as that they could prevent its being continually harrass'd and insulted by an Enemy that is thus superior at Sea; and who can appear now on this side, now on that, and whose Motions it is impossible any Troops on Shore can follow or observe.
What strange Havock could the Allies, thus arm'd, and Superior at Sea, make upon the Coast of
Spain?
and whether they ever landed or no, their very hovering upon the Coast is Alarm enough to keep the whole Country waking, and hurry and fatigue their Soldiers to Death, by hasty Marches in a hot Climate; so that the Troops would be ruin'd as effectually, as if they had been beaten in the Field.
As to their blustering about
Gibraltar,
and threatning to besiege it with twenty five thousand Men, I may speak of it by it self; But let us look a little off of their Military Part, to that of their Commerce.
The first Attack they have made upon us there, (for there also they are Aggressors) is their publick prohibiting the wearing our Manufacture in their Country;
Prohibiting the Importation follows of Course.
How ill they are able to furnish Manufactures, by the Industry of their own People, to supply the Place of ours, I have mention'd already; but let me ask the
Spaniards
a few Trading Questions upon this Occasion.
Trading Nations never prohibit the Exportation of their own Goods, whether the Growth of their Country, or the Labour of their People. To Prohibit Trade with
England,
is to prohibit the Exportation of their own Growth, which by the way is the main Wealth of their Country; I mean as to its home Product: And can they live without the Trade with
England?
Have they consider'd what they shall do, if
England
finding the
Spaniards
refuse to take off their Cloths and Stuffs, their Woollen Manufacture of all Kinds, and their other needful Exports, should refuse to take off their Wines, Brandies, Oil, Raisins, Oranges, Lemons, Almonds, Soap,
Spanish
Wool? and if
France
should refuse their Wool and Iron, and all their other Produce? They need not perhaps forbid their Subjects the wearing any Silks or Stuffs of
England
or
France,
they would be naked enough; for they would soon have no Money to buy them, and must be glad to buy Blankets and Woadmill of the
Moors
of
Africk,
to cover them.
Xeres de la Fronteira
is a Place near the Coast, in the Bay between
Cadiz
and
Sevil;
that Country is full of Vines, and they tell us that they make sixty thousand Pipes or Buts of Sherrey every Year, and most of this is brought away by the
English, Dutch
and
Hamburgers;
but if the
English
and
Dutch
refuse it, how will all that Country live? how will the Vines run wild, and be ruin'd, the People starve, and have no Employment, and the Lands lye waste?
The like is to be said of their Oil and Soap at
Sevil,
of which the Quantity is exceeding great, so that they have one Wood opposite to
Sevil
nine Leagues in Circuit, all of Olive-Trees, from which they tell us they make sixteen thousand Quintals of Soap in a Year; but unless they can sell off this Soap and the Oil to
England, Holland,
&c. all will be waste, for the Quantity they can consume at home is next tonothing.
The
Canary Islands
have no other considerable Market for their Wines but to
England,
except what casual Ships take off, going to
Africa
or
America;
if the
English
forsake the Place, and leave off the Trade, those Islands are undone; and the
Spaniards
themselves have always been so sensible of this, that when there has been a War between the two Nations, the King of
Spain
has always allow'd the
Canary
Trade to be open to
England,
and to enjoy as it were a Neutrality, that their Wines may be taken off.
From thence let us go on to the South Coast of
Spain
in the
Mediterranean,
and there is first
Malaga,
a City flourishing and rich; the Customs they say pay the King of
Spain
eighty thousand Pieces of Eight a Year for that one Port. But with whom is their Trade? I insist that five Parts of six of their whole Trade is with the
English;
the Wines, especially those we now call
white Mountain,
(call'd so, because they grow on the Sides of the Hills, on all the North Part of
Granada
) who Buys them, and where are they Drank? The
French
buy no Wines, the
Italians
buy no Wines, the
Moors
are all
Mabometans,
they drink none; none but the
English,
and perhaps one Ship or two at most to
Holland.
Their Raisons, called
Malaga
Raifins, come almost all to
England;
their Lemons go indeed to
Holland,
and the Neighbouring Coasts; but three times as many to
England,
as to all other Places; and what will the Loss of such a Trade be to them? How will the Country be ruin'd, and the People starv'd, if they cannot put off their Wine and Fruit?
The Trade at
Alicant
is much the same as at
Malaga,
only their Wines are richer; such as
Tent,
and red
Alicant,
bought usually to give Strength and Colour to other Wines. Their Raifins are the best in the World, and are Ship'd off yearly in a prodigious Quantity; but all chiefly to
England.
The same Trade continues a long way on the Coast of
Valentia:
Upon the
Catalonian
Coast there is the same Trade for Wines,
viz.
at
Bene Carlo, Barcellona,
and other Ports; but all for
England;
also some Brandy is brought from thence; and who will have the Loss, if all these Wines are left upon their Hands?
It must be the most ignorant thing in the World of its kind, to have the
Spaniards
prohibit wearing our Manufactures, when they have no other to wear; and to stop the Trade to
England,
when they have no other Market for their General Produce.
But I return now to the Affair of a War: What is
Spain
a doing? They tell us they are drawing an Army together to attack
Gibraltar;
but do the
Spaniards
consider two things?
First,
That
Gibraltar
is so situated, that it cannot be attack'd? Do they remember that the Marshal
de Tesse
sent the King of
France
Word, that to continue the Siege of
Gibraltar
would but ruin the whole Infantry, and that forty thousand Men could never take it by Land?
Secondly,
Do they know, that as soon as they begin this Enterprize, they may expect the
French
with two Armies upon their Frontiers, one on the Side of
Catalonia,
and the other on the Side of
Navarr?
and that by drawing their Troops off to the remotest Angle of their vast Country of
Spain,
they must leave their Frontiers open to the
French?
and that it will be very hard to bring them back upon an Emergence, when they are at least five hundred Miles off?
But we are answered, That 'tis a Mistake; the King of
Spain
is not forming the Siege of
Gibraltar,
he has only ordered a Fort, or some Forts, to be built in proper Places, and upon his own Lands, which is no Breach of the Peace; for sure he may have the Liberty to do what he pleases upon his own Lands.
We cannot give an Answer to this here, because we do not know how far the Fact is true, and we have it yet by Report only. But this we may venture to say.
If the
Spaniards
build, or fortifie in the Neighbourhood of
Gibraltar,
or on the Bay, or Coast about it, as it reported, 'tis either to incommode the Town and Port of
Gibraltar,
or it is not; if it is not, and there is no Reason to take umbrage at it, or complain of it; then I suppose we shall not complain of it, for
England
will certainly take no Offence, where no Cause of Offence is given.
But if this is done with Design, either to Streighten and Block up the Town, or to incommode the Navigation of the Port and the Commerce; This is in a plain Sense an Act of Hostility, and can be taken for no other; and Force is not to be Complain'd of only, but to be Repell'd.
Not but that even in this, the
Spaniards
seem to be rather showing their Teeth, than any thing else. Nor does it appear that they are able to do any considerable Injury to the Port, and none at all to the Town of
Gibraltar.
The Bay of
Gibraltar
is at least five Miles over at the Entrance, that is, from Cape to Cape; and 'tis not less than three or four Miles over, within the Bay, opposite to the Town, and where the old Town of
Gibraltar
stood.
The Depth of Water is such, that the largest Ships may ride almost any where; and they have from 30 to 50 Fathom Water, right against, and near to the Entrance of the Mole, and in the Offing they find no Ground at 100 Fathom,
as appears by the Plan.
Whatever the
Spaniards
can pretend to do by Fortifying the opposite Shore, I leave to the Judgment of the Publick; as I do, whether they ought to be allowed to Fortify there, or no.
As to any thing they can do by Land to
Gibraltar,
I believe the Government are in no great Pain about it; only that they will take Care to put such a Garrison into it, as may give the
Spaniards
occasion to be more appehensive of Disturbance from the Town, than the Town from them.
The Town is a
Peninsula:
'tis to be attack'd no way in Form, but by that small Neck of Land which joyns it to the Continent of
Spain;
and there the Access to it is Naturally so difficult, and by the Addition of Art made so impracticable, that I believe the Garrison are in no Pain about what the
Spaniards
can do that way. Upon the Whole, I may say of
Gibraltar,
as the
French
formerly said of
Dunkirk,
Il et une Place Terrible
For the farther Information of the Reader, and to make what I have said be perfectly Intelligible, I have here given a Plan of the Situation, as well of the Bay, as of the Town, and of the opposite Coast; by which the Reader will judge, whether the
Spaniards
Act like Men in their Senses, or no, in pretending to attack the Place, while at the same Time they know they are not Masters of the Sea, or able to hinder its being relieved as often as there is Occasion.
The Bay of
Gibraltar,
with a View of the Town, &c.
A. Entrance into the Bay.
B. Variation of the Compass.
C. Riding for Small Ships.
D. Ditto for Men of War.
E. No Ground here at 100 Fath̄ .
F. Road of old Gibraltar.
G. Town of old Gibraltar.
H. Road to Cadiz.
I. The Ballast River.
K. Cape Cabrita.
L. The Channel of ye Straits.
M. M. Two small Rivers
N. An old Tower.
1. The Town of Gibraltar.
2. The South Bulwark.
3. A New Battery.
4. The New Mole.
5. Cape Gibraltar or Europe P• .
6. Signal House.
7. Willis's Battery.
8. New Fortifications.
9. Old Mole.
10. The great Hospital.
11. The Works rais'd by the French in the Former Siege, now demolish'd.
12. A
Battery.
13. Redout.
A Scale of three English-Miles.
CONCLUSION.
HAVING thus observed the angry impotent Disposition of the Neighbouring Powers in the
Vienna Treaty,
for a War; it remains to inquire, What our Share may be in it? and what
England
has to be frighted and terrify'd at, among all those Blusters and high Words?
For my Part, I have considered, with all possible Gravity, every Part of the Thing, and I can see no Thunder in all these Clouds; the gathering Vapours may portend some Storm, but I don't see it can reach us; I wish other People would examine it too.
The utmost I can see in it all, is, that they may put us to some Expence, and that is (in its Kind) a Grievance, 'tis true; but let the
Spaniards
look out sharp; 'tis Ten to One but we may make our selves whole at their Expence, one Way or other. Now and then a Galeon or two falling in our Way, may make us Amends for a whole Expedition; and we must have worse Luck than ordinary, if we chop upon none of them.
In the first Place; Their Privateering will not give us much Uneasiness in our Trade; a Thing which was always our great Inconvenience in a War, either with the
French
or
Dutch.
There are but three Places which will be against us in this War, where Privateers of any Note are usually fitted out.
1. The Port of
Ostend.
2. The
Biscayners,
that is to say, the Ports of St.
Sebastian
and St.
Andero.
3. The
Majorkins
in the
Mediterranean.
The First of these have been considerable, in former Wars. But will be now so surrounded (all the Ports of
Great Britain, France,
and
Holland,
being shut against them, and all the Ships of those Powers being their Enemies) that I do not see how they will dare to stir out; or if they should take a Prize, how they would be able to carry it home; the utmost they could do, would be to Cruise upon the Coast of
Spain,
that they might have the Ports of
Galitia,
or of
Andalusia,
for their Retreat; and that would not be so fatal to us, but that we might venture them there. But all our Channel Trade, Coal Trade, and Coast Trade, would be very quiet and undisturb'd; which three Articles were the great Sufferers in the last Wars with
France,
and are generally so in any War with the Marine Powers on this Side of the World.
The
Biscayams,
again, have the same Restraint, in its Degree; for as the
French
are at their Door, and our Trade lying so distant as the Mouth of the Channel, they must go a great way for Purchase, and have a long Run back again for Safety, when they take a Prize; in which Case, 'tis great Odds but they may be met with, by either
French
or
English.
In the late War, when they had all the
French
Coast to befriend them, and could run into any of their Ports, either in Stress of Weather, or when chas'd, or when favour'd with a good Prize, then indeed their Risque was not so great, and sometimes they made a good Hand of it. But I am much mistaken if they will pretend to fit out many Privateers upon all the Coasts, as the Case is like to stand with them now.
3. The
Majorkins
then are the only People left; and their Roving may be confined to the
Mediterranean;
where there are three Things to be observed, which makes our Trade pretty secure:
1. The
Majorkin
Rovers are all small, they never carry above Eight, to Twelve, and Sixteen Guns, being rather Sloops, and a kind of Galley-built Vessels, than Ships; made for nimble Sailing, and Roving also; and they dare not attack Ships of good Force.
2. Most of our Ships Trading into those Seas, are Ships of good Force, and particularly in Case of a War, will be so; from Twenty-four to Thirty-six Guns, and will seldom go without Convoy neither; so that the
Majorkins
will very rarely venture upon them.
3.
Majorca
is so Situated between
Gibraltar
and
Port-Mahon,
that they will find it very hard to keep the Seas, without being intercepted by some of our Men of War, who will be perfectly Masters of the Sea, and be always Cruising between the Straits Mouth and that Island; and also Westward, between the Island and the Coast of
Italy.
Thus, I think, we need not be very anxious for our Trade, on Account of their Privateers. Some few may indeed appear in the Bay of
Cadiz,
fitted out at Port St.
Mary, Sevil,
S. L
and those Places, and may Cruise off of the Southward Cape, and the Coast of
Portugal.
But 'tis hoped we may have so good a Look-out there for Galeons, and such People, that the Privateers will find but little Good upon that Coast.
We are told, indeed, that the
Spaniards
will have Privateers and Cruisers among our Islands in the
West-Indies,
in the Gulph of
Florida,
and on the Coast of
Carolina
and
Virginia;
these may, indeed, harbour at the
Havana,
St.
Augustine,
and St.
Domingo,
and have several Skulking Places on the North Side of the Gulph of
Mexico:
But as our Squadron in those Seas is already very strong, and likely to be stronger, it may be no difficult Matter to keep those Seas clear; and perhaps the
Havana
may not always be a Retreat for them, as strong as it is; of which more may be said when a War (if it is to be a War) is actually begun.
Having thus stated the Case, as to Privateering, let us examine the other great Articles, in which the Enemy think they can wound us; and they are, I think, but two.
1. Prohibitions of Commerce.
2. Alarms about the Pretender.
1. Prohibitions of Commerce. It is true, every Prohibition of Commerce to a Trading Country, as this is, may in some particular Case or other be a Loss, as it stops some of the Channels of our Trade, by which our great Vent of Woollen Manufacture in particular, is circulated and extended in the World. But it is also the particular Happiness of our Woollen Manufacture, that the several Countries where it is carried and sold, are generally in as much want of the Goods, or of the Sale and Consumption of those Goods which
England
takes in Return for them, as we can be of the Sale of ours; and in particular, the King of
Spain
is eminent for both these Circumstances; as has been mentioned already.
The Consequence of this has always been, that either by Connivance, or by the Interposition of Neutral Nations, Trade has always found private Channels of Conveyance; and the Merchants find Ways and Means to furnish themselves on one Hand, and dispose of their Product on the other; so that such Prohibitions serve indeed to make Things sell for a better Price than ordinary, but seldom put a full Stop to the Trade. Were it so, I dare venture to affirm,
Spain
would be the greatest Loser by the Prohibition, besides being far from the best able to bear it.
What Lengths the
Imperialists
may go in Prohibitions of Commerce, we yet do not see; but should they do their utmost (as I said above) they would do their own Subjects much more Damage than they can do us. And I appeal to the Experience of the Men of Commerce for Proof of the Fact.
First,
Suppose a Stop of Commerce with
Flanders,
that is to say, with the
Imperial Netherlands,
which is what some People seem to apprehend.
It is true, they may stop the Importation of our Woollen Manufacture thither, tho' with all their Prohibitions Trade will find Vents there too, as well as it has done in
France,
and other Countries; and 'tis presum'd, the Prohibition must be as universal as the War, that is to say, with
Holland, France,
and
Great Britain
all together; and how the
Flemings
will find their Account in that, is for them to judge, not for me.
But to speak to it only as to
England.
Pray who will be the greatest Sufferers in such a Prohibition?
England,
for want of the Vent of some Woollen Manufacture (tho' indeed not very considerable) which are usually sent to
Flanders?
Or the
Low Countries,
for want of the Sale of their
Cambricks
and fine
Brussels
and
Mecblin
Lace? of both which so exceeding a Demand is made here, by the Humour and Fancy of our Ladies running into the Wear and Use of those two Articles, and the Price of which is of late so extravagant, that the Ballance of Trade between the two Countries is evidently to the Advantage of the
Flemings,
and that in a prodigious Degree. So that I cannot but say, a Prohibition of Commerce between them, would be at this Time one of the kindest Things the Emperor could do for us, and we shall have no Reason to be sorry or anxious about it, whenever it begins. Our only Business (at least I think so) would be, whenever they make the Prohibition on their Side, to take care it be duly Executed on our Side.
There is but one Part of the World more, where the Emperor can make any considerable Prohibition of Commerce with us by Sea, and that is in
Italy;
and I am perswaded his Council, if they are Men of Common Understanding in Business, will never advise his Imperial Majesty to take such a Step. Let us examine the Particulars briefly:
This Prohibition can only extend to the Ports of the Kingdom of
Naples,
in the West and South Side of
Italy,
and the Ports of
Messina, Palermo,
&c. in
Sicily.
In return for which, he first of all stops the
English
taking off the Oil of
Gallipoli,
and then the Thrown Silk of
Naples
and
Sicily;
and at the same Time as he has not Power to prohibit the
English
Commerce at
Leghorn,
the Manufacture of
Great Britain
will be only carried thither, instead of being carried to
Messina
and
Naples,
and the Merchants will send thither to buy them; for we are assur'd they must and will have them.
In a Word,
Great Britain
laughs at their Prohibitions: Nor can the War, with which they threaten us, be any way fatal to our Trade, no, not in any one Place.
I might say something here to the Stop this War might seem to give to the Vent of
English
Manufactures in the
Spanish West-Indies:
But if I should say, on the other Hand, that the
Spaniards
seem really not to know what they are doing in that Particular; and that it is more likely, if they don't consider it in time, that
England
may open a Door there to the Commerce, which it may never be in the
Spaniards
Power to shut up; and that a direct Trade from
England
to
New Spain,
may be a full Satisfaction to us for all their other Attempts upon our Trade, that they either have made, or can make to our Prejudice; I should say nothing but what I could very effectually explain
2. As to their Menacing us with the Pretender; the Damage to Trade being my present Subject, I shall say little to it here: It is so remote from them as well as from us, they are so little able to do any thing in it, and the Creature himself has so little in him to make him Formidable, that I think it hardly worth naming.
Yet one Thing I cannot but observe in this (otherwise insignificant) Thing, call'd the Pretender;
viz.
That as it was in the Time of one of the greatest
English
Monarchs who ever wore the Crown, I mean
Henry
VII, that his Enemies, whenever they had a Mind to make him uneasy, always play'd one Impostor or other upon him, such as
Simnel, Perkin Warbeck,
and the like, so they would do now.
Thus whenever any Foreign Power designs to raise Distractions among us, and to Insult the King of
Great Britain
in any Quarter whatever, they will always play the Pretender upon us. If the King of
Spain
has the least View of Resentment depending against
England,
presently the late Duke of
Ormond
comes to Court, and has an Audience of his Catholick Majesty. And the late Earl Marischal, a
Scots
Refugee (and who it seems is in Commission under the King of
Spain
) is ordered to set aside his Journey to
Andalusia,
and the like; as if by these remove Motions,
Great Britain
was to be Alarmed, and that it was to be understood, that something was doing, or contriving to be done on that Side, in Favour of that despicable Interest, call'd Jacobitism.
I remember we read in the Story of
Henry
VII. That when that first Imposture was Que
ed, and Si
(who was play'd upon that Prince as a Pretender) fell into his Hand; instead of putting him to Death (as Justice indeed demanded) the King, to let his Enemies see how he contemned the Attempt, took the poor miserable Thing and set him in the Royal Kitchin to turn the Spit, and lick the Trenchers, despising thereby not the Person only, but the Party.
The Inference I think is just;
England
has so little to fear from the Pretender, or from the Nest of Pretenders now in
Italy,
for it seems there is a new Succession of Pretenders in the Hands of the Pope and his Priests; I say,
England
has so little to fear from them, that the greatest Contempt is to be put upon all these little Motions; and they ought to give us no other Alarm, than only to take care to keep Jacobitism down at home, to keep them in the same State of Mortification and Humiliation that they are already in, and then not to fear their Agents from abroad.
In a word, it seems to be the Cafe, as I have already said in
Spain;
now tho' Jacobitism is not so inconsiderable as not to be worth our setting our Foot upon it, yet 'tis far from being so considerable as to make us afraid of it. No Thief is so inconsiderable as that we need not shut our Doors and bar our Windows when we go to Bed, to keep them out; but all the Thieves in the Nation are not so considerable, but that when we have fastened our Doors, and the Watch is set, we can sleep in quiet, and defy them.
Again, I must say, it is a Piece of Kindness to the Jacobites themselves, who as they are a Deluded and Imposed upon People, call for some Pity from even the Government which they offend; and the kindest thing the Government of
Great-Britain
can do for them, is to take away all their Hopes, foreclose their Expectations, and show them how impossible the Resurrection of their Party is, under the present Dispositions; and how effectually every Back-Door is barred up against them, that so their Hopes being entirely destroyed, they may learn to despair, and no more precipitate themselves into certain Ruin, in attempting to revive a Cause that is not to be revived.
Besides, it is worth their while to reflect upon what Foot it is, that these Foreign People bring their lost Cause into the Question;
namely,
for nothing but to play it upon the Nation, if possible, in the Nature of a Diversion, or to give an Alarm, reserving it always in
Petto,
to give it up whenever they are reduc'd to the Necessity of making a Peace; and that even the greatest Prince that ever espoused them, sacrificed their whole Interest, when he found it needful to make a Peace at their Expence.
I had purposed here to have enter'd into a useful, and a serious Discourse, concerning the Expedition to
Porto Belo;
and the Posting the
British
Squadron under Admiral
Hosier,
at the Islands call'd
Les Bastimento's,
on the Coast of the
Ist
mus
of
America;
and to have given a like Plan of the Situation of those Islands, as I have here of
Gibraltar,
and how they respect the Harbour of
Porto Belo;
But as this would require also, that I should consider the great Advantages which lye before us in a formal and further Prosecution of that Attempt; and how
Great-Britain
in the carrying on this War, may give a new Turn to the Commerce of that Part of the World, infinitely to the Advantage of these Islands, and yet without giving Umbrage to the Allies, by making any Attempts to seize upon the Country it self; and that I purpose to handle that Subject by it self, as soon as the publick Affairs discover themselves, so as to make it acceptable; for that Reason, and also, because I have not room to speak effectually to it here, I refer it to another Occasion.
FINIS.